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L Introduction
Drugs and other pharmaceutical products are of such great importance,
both to public health and to the national economy, that the issues surrounding
their development, approval, use, and effects have spawned a considerable
volume of litigation. Drug and pharmaceutical litigation can be broken down
into three important categories based on distinct stages at which litigation is
likely to arise. These include (1) suits for and against Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) approval of new or reformulated drugs, which occur both
before and after the drug is available on the market, (2) false advertising and
patent infringement suits that develop as a result of the marketing of the drug,
and (3) products liability suits that develop as a result of consumers' use of
the drug.'
At each of these potential stages of litigation, parties are likely to encoun-
ter the concept of (or at least the use of the phrase) "clinical significance."
This Note will demonstrate an absence of definition and an unevenness of
understanding and application of that phrase in all of these drug-related
contexts.
2
It is not necessarily the case that the phrase itself is innately flawed
(although "significance" is certainly a word that can present difficulties in
interpretation).' When the words "clinical" and "significant" have specific
1. Another way in which it is possible to characterize these three types of cases is in
terms of the typical party structure underlying them. FDA approval cases are typically Drug
Company vs. United States Government. Patent infringement and false advertising cases are
typically Drug Company vs. Competitor Drug Company. Products liability cases are typically
Consumer vs. Drug Company. This varying structure is important in understanding the different
roles that drug companies, in particular, must play in the different drug-related contexts.
2. Infra Part H.
3. See infra Part V.C (discussing problematic use of word "significance").
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definitions, either alone or in concert, for a given context, the potential
problems are minimized, if not obviated entirely.' Such definitions may come
from statutes or from precedents in case law.' The definitions may be, and
4. Even when there is some consensus on a meaning of or a standard for the phrase
"clinical significance," there still may be disputes on related issues; consensus on that element
would not necessarily solve all of the problems. Even when an objective threshold exists for
defining "clinically significant" evidence of a given disease, this does not settle the crucial
question of causation. The causation analysis is related to the definitional problem, as there are
cases that do associate the two concepts. For example, in a case of asbestos exposure, while
there was no doubt that as a cumulative result of years of employment, a worker had contracted
asbestosis, the question of clinical significance concerned the extent to which the last employer
of a disabled worker should be liable for contribution to the disease acquired over a longer
course of employment. See Mathis v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 499 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Or. Ct.
App. 1972) (stating that principal issue on appeal is extent to which last employer of disabled
workman caused or contributed to disability). The last employer conceded that there had been
"some minimal degree of inhalation of asbestos fibers" during the final employment period, but
it was deemed "not medically probable that clinically signifcant exposure to asbestos occurred
during the four months at the last employer." Id. (emphasis added). This indicates that clinical
significance is in some way related to causation, but fails to explain that association explicitly.
5. One example of this definition occurs in the context of Black Lung benefits cases, in
which coal miners or their widows may claim workers' compensation benefits for the disease
pneumoconiosis ("Black Lung disease"). To do so, the first thing that the claimant must prove
is that he has the disease. 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.202, 718.205(a)(1) (2001). One of the ways in
which he may do this is by means of radiographic (i.e. X-ray) evidence. Id. § 718.202(aXl) (2).
The relevant case law and statutes have established specific standards for finding this evidence
"significant," such that a score of 1/0 or better on the X-ray reading indicates significant
evidence of pneumoconiosis, while a score of 0/1 indicates no significance. Shuck v. Consoli-
dation Coal Co., No. 99-2521, 2001 WL 120000, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 2001). These
standards cover the identification of the disease. The "significance" analyses in these cases and
statutes are concerned with causation as well because to be eligible for benefits, the claimant
must show that the pneumoconiosis arose at least in part out of coal mine employment 20
C.F.R. § 718.203(a) (2001). Therefore, there are precise definitions for "significance" in that
context as well. In the miners' cases, the standard for whether pneumoconiosis was significant
in creating a total disability considers whether "the miner's pneumoconiosis arose at least in part
out of coal mine employment." Id. § 718.203(a). In the widows' cases, the standard for
significance is whether "pneumoconiosis was a substantially contributing cause or factor leading
to the miner's death" (which the regulation glosses as "hastening the miner's death"). Id.
§ 718.205(cX2), (5).
There still may be disagreement among experts in the reading of individual X-rays to
decide whether the objective threshold (as to the existence of the disease) has been reached in
a particular case. See Burehett v. Matthews, 575 F.2d 1189, 1190 (6th Cir. 1978) (citing
conflicting reading and scoring of X-ray evidence). However, there is at least a recognized
standard from which to work. See Colvert v. Ala. By-Prods. Corp., 115 F. Supp 493, 496-99
(N.D. Ala. 1953) (noting "unanimous agreement [among a group of specialists] that essential
to the diagnosis of the clinically significant disease of pneumonoconiosis was roentgenographic
identification of the disease in an X-ray of the chest," and noting that their agreement also is
"currently accepted by an overwhelming majority of members of [the] medical profession who
specialize in lung diseases," and rejecting other apparently less objective standards proposed
by specialists in the minority).
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indeed may have to be, only for very narrowly limited contexts.6 When these
definitions appear, there is clarity and uniformity sufficient to make the terms
useful in their given context.
However, despite this apparent capacity for precision of meaning and
relative uniformity of understanding when the terms are defined and used
separately, confusion and ambiguity are much more typical where the phrase
"clinical significance" is concerned. The contrast between the majority and
the dissenting opinions in a Sixth Circuit case, Glaser v. Thompson Medical
Co.,7 exemplifies the confusion.' Although the majority in Glaser uses the
phrase "clinical significance" several times throughout its opinion, nowhere
does it provide any definition or explication. The best indication of the
While these standards can be tied only to the word "significant," rather than to the entire
phrase "clinical significance," the addition of "clinical" often appears in the Black Lung case
law. Relevant medical definitions, for example, of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD), which are sometimes cited in the Black Lung cases, may incorporate the phrase. See
Smith v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Progs., Dep't of Labor, 999 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1993)
(citing TBE MERCK MANUAL 628 (14th 1982), which defines COPD as "clinically significant,
irreversible, generalized airways obstruction associated with varying degrees of chronic
bronchitis, abnormalities in small airways, and emphysema"). In this way, and even more
directly, as shall appear in further discussions in this Note, the phrase has a way of creeping into
the legal terminology in a somewhat misleading way, as even here there is no explicit definition
for "clinical significance."
6. See supra note 5 (narrowing context to one means of finding one disease). It is
perhaps realistic to acknowledge at the outset the possibility that one may be able to define the
phrase only in a narrow context for a very precise issue, disease, or drug. As one author has
pointed out, "importance" (the same, for the purposes of this Note, as "significance") is always
necessarily context-specific. See WILLIAM A. SILVERMAN, HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: A
Gun)ED STEP INTO THE UNKNOWN 121 (1985) (stating that "the definition of an 'important'
difference requires some review from the point of view of the underlying theories about the
pathologic process that is under study"). Because of the broad range of topics involved, it might
be unrealistic to attempt to define clinical significance across the board for all drug cases. This
is precisely why, after closer examination, it may appear to make little sense to use the phrase
"clinical significance" in the ways in which it is currently used - that is, without more explicit,
precise, and context-specific definitions.
7. 32 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1994).
8. Glaser v. Thompson Med. Co., 32 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1994). In Glaser, a consumer
brought a suit for negligence and breach of warranty against a pharmaceutical company on the
grounds that ingestion of the drug Dexatrim caused hypertension, which in turn caused a stroke,
which in turn caused the consumer to fall, hit his head, and suffer further severe injuries. Id.
at 970-71. The district court granted summary judgment to the drug company, but the appeals
court remanded the case due to unresolved issues of material fact as to questions of causation
at each stage of the events alleged. Id. In analyzing causation, the court looked to studies
performed on the drug, without being able to reach a conclusion on the question of whether it
could cause hypertension. Id. at 975. Aside from the studies themselves, the court also empha-
sized the qualifications of the expert physician involved, in terms of his experience and exper-
tise. Id. at 972, 975.
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majority's understanding is its apparent reliance on one expert's statement
that the averages necessarily involved in finding "statistical significance"
actually hide the real variations that are "clinically significant" for individual
patients.9 This suggests a vague idea of clinical significance as something that
can be determined by an individual physician by observation of an individual
patient, in spite of statistics suggesting that the observation, and more impor-
tantly, the causal relationship posited, is untrustworthy. In his dissent in
Glaser, Judge Boggs shows less confidence in the same expert's evidence."0
He points to testimony from the expert's deposition that demonstrates the
uncertainty of the expert's conclusions, as well as the flaws in the implications
on which the court has relied." He points to evidence of statistical signifi-
cance without clinical significance and points out that "significant" in this
context, when unmodified, really means "statistically significant."' 2 It thus
appears that even a single court cannot come to an agreement about the proper
usage and meaning of the phrase "clinical significance."
This lack of clarity and uniformity presents a host of problems. It is not
simply an academic problem of language and syntax, but also a practical prob-
lem that stands in the way ofthe clarity and predictability desirable for fair and
efficient administration of the law.13 The possible ramifications are serious.
9. Id. at 975.
10. Id. at 979.
11. See id. at 981-82 (stressing expert's use of "opinion," "in my mind," "maybe," and "I
believe" in expressing his testimony). Judge Boggs also noted: "A good bit of the disagreement
that I have with the court's opinion is in its use, or acceptance of Dr. Zaloga's use, of words
such as 'cause' and 'significantly."' Id. at 988.
12. Id. at 983-984.
13. There are, of course, other important legal and non-legal ramifications here as well.
One closely related example in the pharmaceutical context is the duty imposed upon pharma-
cists to recognize "clinically significant" drug interactions and to discuss them with the prescrib-
ing physician. See, e.g., Paul 0. Oussing, A Comparison of Empirical Studies of Pharmacy
Practice with JudicialDescriptions, 44 DRAKEL. REV. 483,495-497 (1996) (listing representa-
tive tasks of pharmacist including questioning prescribing physician about cases in which
clinically significant drug interactions or contraindications exist); David W. Hepplewhite, A
TraditionalLegalAnaysis of the Roles andDuties ofPharmacists, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 519, 566
(1996) (requiring that pharmacology candidates "be able to recognize clinically significant
drug-drug or food-drug interactions, recognize the mechanism of interaction, and select
alternative measures to minimize or reduce the interaction"); Kathy Laughter Laizure, Note, The
Pharmacist's Duty to Warn W'hen Dispensing Prescription Drugs: Recent Tennessee Develop-
ments, 22 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 517, 537-38 (1992) (discussing pharmacists' use of clinical
significance). Laizure explains:
Drug interactions, however, vary greatly in clinical significance, based on the
probability that they will occur and the resulting effects of the interaction. This
raises the question of when the pharmacist has the duty to intervene. Is the pharma-
cist required to intervene when the interaction is of moderate or minimal clinical
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For example, if drug companies do not know what the definition of
"clinical significance" is, or how it will be implemented, or what weight it will
bear, they stand at a disadvantage in presenting their cases. Even if one
jurisdiction resolves these issues, that resolution may have no basis at all in
another jurisdiction. Without a uniform concept - even within a very particu-
lar context - large drug companies involved in litigation in multiple jurisdic-
tions may have to bring or defend similar claims inconsistently.
From another angle, those researching new drugs, if they have no defini-
tion of clinical significance, will not be able to structure their studies from the
outset to determine whatever the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
another drug company, or a consumer may later require them to show in the
way of "clinical significance." Furthermore, if the government and the drug
companies do not have a clear understanding of clinical significance, and if
it is actually important, consumers run the risk of harm from improperly
studied drugs or from over- or under-cautiousness in the use of the drugs due
to a clash of statistical and clinical significance. Finally, consumers face the
same difficulties as the drug companies in bringing claims in ignorance of the
ways in which clinical significance may be used in their cases.
All of these potential problems hamper the sort of predictability that
makes the justice system work smoothly, efficiently, and fairly. The Supreme
Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 4 developed gate-
keeping standards for objective scientific determinations." The intention of
significance? For example, certain antibiotics are known to reduce the effectiveness
of oral contraceptives when given concomitantly. Is the pharmacist negligent if he
or she fails to advise the patient to utilize alternative methods of birth control while
taking this medication, even though this is classified a Level 2, or moderately
clinically significant, interaction?
Id. (citations omitted).
Of course there are many other contexts in which the phrase "clinical significance"
appears, none of which will be a part of the discussion in this Note. Some examples from
among these are cases dealing with psychological conditions, living wills, disability and
workers' compensation (although Black Lung cases will be used briefly for comparison), and
FAA medical certification regulations.
14. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
15. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 n.7 (1993) (noting that
"Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility" and undertaking "to note the
nature and source of the duty"). This case involved a suit against a pharmaceutical manufacturer
for birth defects (limb reductions) allegedly caused by mothers' ingestion of the drug Bendectin.
Id. at 579. The Supreme Court stated that "general acceptance" was not the proper criterion for
admitting expert scientific testimony. Id. at 588-89. The Court held that it is the role of the trial
judge to determine both reliability and relevance of scientific evidence. Id. at 589. The Court
established the following four factors for determining reliability ofthis evidence: (1) whether
the inference or assertion was derived by "scientific method," namely whether the theory can
be tested and falsified; (2) subjection to peer review and publication; (3) existence of a known
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the Daubert Court was to increase the reliability of expert scientific
evidence. 6 Without a uniform objective definition for "clinical significance"
in the drug context, the phrase easily may present an opportunity for litigants
to frustrate the Daubert standards by doing an end run around them, offering
subjective medical judgments unsupported by reliable data." Should this
problem remain unaddressed, it may become only more pervasive. Thus, it is
important to determine what "clinical significance" means (if it means any-
thing) and how it may or may not be appropriate for use in each of these types
of litigation.
As Justice Benjamin Cardozo pointed out in the context of trying to
define "ordinary and necessary," "[o]ne struggles in vain for any verbal
formula that will supply a ready touchstone. The standard set up by the
statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness
must supply the answer to the riddle."'" Perhaps this is also true of the search
for the meaning of "clinical significance," but it is important at least to attempt
to find the answer to the current riddle in case law as well as legislative and
academic materials.
This Note examines the ambiguous and inconsistent meanings of "clini-
cal significance" in four different modes of analysis. 9 Part II examines
closely the vocabulary and syntax that courts have used in discussing clinical
significance.2' This section demonstrates the ambiguity, subjectivity, and
inconsistency of the phrase as it is currently used. Part Il examines and
analyzes the use of the phrase "clinical significance" in the context of drug
or potential error rate; and (4) general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. Id. at
.589-95.
16. See id. at 590 n.9 (stressing importance of "evidentiary reliability" of scientific
evidence). The Daubert standards require that an expert demonstrate that his conclusions are
based in "a grounding in the methods and procedures of science" and that they constitute "more
than subjective belief or unsupported speculation." Id. at 590.
17. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co.,
No. CIVA.97-2307, 2000 WL 145758 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 4,2000)). Linnen illustrates how
litigants can use a malleable formulation of "clinical significance" to frustrate Daubert.
18. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
19. The logical first step in approaching this problem is to look for an explicit definition
in case law or statutes. This approach, however, has proven largely futile. While it is always
difficult to prove a negative, there are enough instances in which a definition might be expected,
and in which no definition appears, that one can have relative confidence in the general absence
of a definition. An extensive search of print publications as well as websites and search engines
related to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), the Federal Register, and the FDA (as well
as its subsidiaries, the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)) has revealed nothing in the way of an explicit defini-
tion.
20. Infra Part 11.
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litigation.2 This section attempts to uncover an indirect definition of the
phrase by comparing and contrasting what clinical significance means and
how it can be demonstrated in the three primary types of drug litigation. Part
IV compares the concept of "clinical significance" with the more defined
concept of "statistical significance."22 Part V examines the use of the phrase
in contexts outside of case law - first in regulatory and then in academic
settings - both legal and medical in nature.2 The Note concludes by evaluat-
ing several possible understandings of "clinical significance" and suggesting
how, if at all, courts and litigants should understand and apply that concept.24
11. Looking at the Language ofAmbiguity and Subjectivity
A. Vocabulary
The vocabulary surrounding the use of the phrase "clinical significance"
demonstrates an uncertainty of meaning and a lack of standardization that
calls into question its usefulness as an objective scientific standard. The verbs
used to proclaim the presence or absence of clinical significance are particu-
larly enlightening in this enquiry. Experts in the cases often "feel, '25 "be-
lieve, 26 or "opine,"" rather than stating outright that there is (or is not)
21. Infra Part Ml.
22. Infra Part IV. This discussion also will incorporate the usage and meanings, for
comparative purposes, of "medical significance" and "therapeutic significance." However, due
to the clarity with which we can define statistical significance, that phrase will provide the focal
point for all of these comparisons. See infra note 97 (defining statistical significance).
23. Infra Part V.
24. Infra Part VI.
25. See Cortez v. Brown, 408 So. 2d 464,465 (Miss. 1991) (quoting physician's expert
testimony: "Ifelt that this was not of clinical significance, since she had no symptoms referable
to the right side.") (emphasis added).
26. See, e.g., Taylor v. Shalala, No. CIVA.92-7226, 1994 WL 111376, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 31, 1994) (citing opinion of examining physician who "agreed that [the plaintiff] had spinal
stenosis, but believed that it was 'not functionally symptomatic or clinically significant'")
(emphasis added); Riehm v. Sullivan, No. 89C20388,1990 WL 304303, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11,
1990) ("X[-]rays appeared normal with the exception of a tiny osteophyte on the anterior aspect
of the Tibia. Dr. Treister believed this was not clinically significant.") (emphasis added);
Volterano v. W.CA.B. (Allied Corp. & Travelers Ins. Co.), 613 A.2d 61, 62 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1992) (citing physician's conclusion that "[c]laimant was an 'emotional cripple' from asbestos
exposure 'not as clinically significant as [claimant] believes'... ") (emphasis added); Scott v.
Porter, 530 S.E.2d 389, 391 (S.C. Ct App. 2000) (stating, in wrongful death case, "[Dr.] Porter
did not believe that Lance's low sodium levels were clinically significant") (emphasis added).
27. See, e.g., Talley v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 945 F.2d 405,405 (6th
Cir. 1991) (noting that physician "opined that Talley had had 'clinically significant' arterial
sclerosis since 1983" but stating that "[physician's] opinion does not contain the specificfind-
ings that are necessary to support a determination that Talley suffered from a listed impairment
560
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clinical significance in a given situation. There is a tendency to use the
passive voice to state that a symptom or condition, for example, "is not
thought to be" clinically significant.' Similarly, the words "possible" and
"unknown" often qualify the phrase. 9 One commentator remarks on the
"difficulty of judging whether or not the [finding] is clinically significant."3
This vocabulary not only underscores the lack of clarity associated with the
phrase, but it also undermines any value a determination of "clinical signifi-
cance" might lend to the questions of causation that so frequently lie at the
heart of drug-related cases.
B. Usage and Syntax
There are interesting aspects of usage and syntax in a few cases that call
into question the objective certainty of the meaning of the phrase, as well as
the certainty with which courts demonstrate their understanding of the phrase.
There are even instances showing a certain reluctance to use the phrase at all.
One example of this is in the use of so-called "scare quotes." A court that is
not actually quoting from another source may nevertheless set the phrase
inside quotation marks." The court seems in this way to indicate to the reader
before February of 1985") (emphasis added); Edwards v. Sullivan, No. CIVA89-8882, 1990
WL 118750, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1990) ("Dr. Klinghoffer opined that the finding was of
questionable clinical significance.") (emphasis added); Follmer Trucking v. Stump, 286 A.2d
1, 4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972) (citing testimony of physician, describing plaintiff's condition:
"which hemorrhage being described as slight and, in the opinion of the pathologist, of little
clinical significance") (emphasis added); Boyc v. Moore, No. 03A01-9812-CV-00424, 1999
WL 1068699, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1999) ("The physician, who examined the scan
at the hospital, opined that the abnormality was of 'doubtful clinical significance' ... ") (em-
phasis added).
28. See Kue v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 18 Cl. Ct. 777, 781 (1989)
(remarking on "bacteria not thought to be of clinical significance" in regard to infant's death
after receiving DPT vaccine).
29. See Tobias v. Shalala, No. CIVA.93-0188, 1993 WL 370637, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept.
15, 1993) (citing, in Social Security benefits case, physician's testimony: "Dr. James W. Keating,
Jr. opined that plaintiff had [a condition] which was possibly clinically significant .... ")
(emphasis added); see also McNeil Pharm. v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 572 (D.C. 1996) (citing
FDA-approved warning label statement: "Rarely, a patient may note discoloration of the urine
resulting from a phenolic metabolite of chlorozoxazone. This finding is of no known clinical
significance.") (emphasis added); Duffield v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-
827V, 1991 WL 275005, at *5 n.19 (Cl. Ct. Dec. '2, 1991) (citing notation to study by
cytogeneticist, who found that chromosomal anomaly had "no known clinical significance")
(emphasis added).
30. Mendel E. Singer, BRCAI: To Test or Not to Tes4 That is the Question, 7 HEALTH
MATRIX 163, 176 (1997).
31. See ZMI Corp. v. Physio-Control Corp., 887 F.2d 1094 (Table), 1989 WL 100888,
at **1 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (summarizing one party's arguments and evidence, but selectively
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that this is a phrase that they have used either because the parties involved
have used it or because it is a phrase that is typically used in this type of case.
In either case, this usage conveys a possible element of discomfort with the
phrase. The extra punctuation may indicate that the court is not certain
enough of the meaning of the phrase, for itself or for its readers, to use it
without reservation. If, on the other hand, the phrase is placed in quotation
marks because it alone is taken as a direct citation from another source, the
phrase still stands out, as if to denote rather obviously, "this is not our own
phrase, but we shall use it because someone else did" (or perhaps, more
simply, "whatever that may mean").
3 2
C. Difference of Reasonable Minds and Credibility of Experts
The fact that reasonable minds often differ over findings of clinical
significance underscores the idea that "clinical significance" is not based on
an objective standard, but a subjective impression. One court states that the
decision before it regarding a battle of experts who differ as to the presence
of clinical significance can be distilled to a simple credibility determination
between the two.33 Another court examined the testimony of two experts on
the issue of whether there was a clinically significant difference between two
competing drugs, only to decide that they found neither expert to be reliable,
and preferred to consider the raw data independently.'
D. Evaluation
Examination of the language involved in the use of the phrase "clinical
significance" in medically-related case law demonstrates a certain ambiguity
not only of actual meaning, but also of understanding. It appears that not even
all of the courts who use the phrase believe that they, or those arguing and
testifying before them, have a clear understanding of what it means. Further-
placing phrase "clinical significance" in quotation marks); see also Charles J. Walsh & Marc
S. Klein, From Dog Food to Prescription Drug Advertising: Litigating False Scientific
EstablishmentClaims Under theLanhamAct, 22 SEToNHALLL. RLrv. 389,436 (1991) (setting
"clinical significance" in quotation marks and leaving "statistical significance" without them).
32. See supra note 31 for an example that may demonstrate this implication simply by the
tenor of the usage.
33. See Bennett-Murray, Inc. v. Barnes, 473 S.E.2d 166, 167-68 (Oa. Ct App. 1996).
(citing, in workers' compensation context, absolute disagreement between two physicians as to
clinical significance of patient's symptoms, noting that this simply leads to determination by
court of superior credit and weight of one expert's opinion over another's).
34. See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 785, 792-93
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating court's dissatisfaction with both sides' expert opinions, finding experts'
analyses unreliable, illogical, and unhelpful, and using raw data to draw direct conclusions).
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more, the ambiguity appears to run in the direction of subjectivity, a direction
that leads away from an objective or uniform standard. The purpose of this
discussion is not to construct an iron man of objectivity out of the field of
science, against which the straw man of legal language would stand no
chance. It is instead to demonstrate that the standard, if any, that is used in the
legal context is far less objective than the field of science might allow. This
is not an attempt to set up a dichotomy, but only to uncover a lack of objectiv-
ity by means of a simple comparison.
Ii. Attempts at Discerning Definition Through Context
A. FDA Approval Cases
The FDA's approval and labeling procedures and requirements for new
or reformulated drugs require an applicant to demonstrate the product's
"effectiveness. 35  The requirement of effectiveness includes a showing not
only of statistical, but also of clinical significance.' However, there is no
apparent statutory or regulatory definition of"clinical significance.01 Never-
theless, an examination of the use of the phrase "clinical significance" in the
cases dealing with FDA approval may shed some light on the understandings
of those who enforce the requirement, as well as those in the drug industry
who must argue about it?5
35. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (dX5Xiv) (2001) (including discussion of effectiveness in list
of items required in application for approval of new drug). The definition of "effectiveness"
used throughout the relevant portions of the CFR is as follows: "a reasonable expectation that,
in a significant proportion of the target population, the.pharmacological effect of the drug, when
used under adequate directions for use and warnings against unsafe use, will provide clinically
significant relief of the type claimed." Id. § 330.10 (emphasis added).
36. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not itself provide explicitly for how the
proponent must demonstrate effectiveness, other than to say "proof of effectiveness shall consist
of controlled clinical investigaions ...." Id. § 601.25. (The reference to "controlled clinical
investigations" appears in the application requirements as well.) Id. § 314.50(dX5Xiv).
However, the FDA has the authority to construe a statute with whose administration it is
charged and receives substantial deference when doing so. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler,
787 F.2d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), for this proposition). The FDA has interpreted the language
of the Act as requiring both statistical and clinical significance. See Warner-Lambert, 787 F.2d
at 154-56 (approving FDA's interpretation).
37. See infra Part VA (discussing usage without definition in CFR). Indeed, even an
extensive examination of the websites of the FDA, the CDER, and the CDC affords no explana-
tion or definition.
38. It is important to address not only how the FDA argues clinical significance and how
judges rule on it, but also how the drug companies involved in litigation either against the FDA
or against other drug companies may press for different understandings of the meanings and
standards involved. The following example shows in greater depth the way in which this prob-
lem works in the approval cases.
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1. What Does "Clinical Significance"Mean?
United States v. 225 Cartons, More or Less, of an Article of Drug (225
Cartons I)9 comes as close as any of the drug approval cases to providing an
actual definition of "clinical significance."4 It sets off the word "clinically"
with an appositive phrase, directly associating "clinically" with "therapeuti-
cally."4 In 225 Cartons II, as well as inSerono Laboratories, Inc. v. Shalala,42
"significance" appears to require, as a threshold finding, some sort of observ-
able effect.43 Without some observable difference or change in status, there
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1986), demonstrates the lack of
clarity in the meaning of clinical significance, as well as the tension between the use of clinical
significance and statistical significance in approval cases. Id. at 154-56. In Warner-Lambert,
drug manufacturers petitioned for review of an FDA decision to withdraw approval for oral
proteolytic enzymes (OPEs). Id. at 148-49. OPEs are prescription drugs that manufacturers
claim to be effective in alleviating swelling and inflammation. Id. at 149. The OPEs in this
case previously had obtained approval under the pre-1962 "safe for human use" standard. Id.
at 149. However, when the standard was changed in 1962 to require a showing of "substantial
evidence" of "effectiveness," the old drugs had to meet the new guidelines. Id at 151. The
Third Circuit held that the FDA requirement of showing "effectiveness" was not satisfied by a
showing of statistical significance alone, but required a showing of effectiveness in terms of
"clinical significance." Id. at 156. While the regulations, as interpreted by the case law, require
a finding of clinical as well as statistical significance for new drug approval, the Code of Federal
Regulations provides no definition of clinical significance. See infra Part VA. The Warner-
Lambert court equated clinical significance with "therapeutic significance" and contrasted it
with statistical significance, but did not provide any explicit definition of either term. Warner-
Lambert, 787 F.2d at 154-156. Perhaps because there is a clearer general understanding of an
objective standard for determining statistical significance, the drug company preferred simply
to rely on that standard as a benchmark for comparison. Id. at 154. However, the court required
that the further standard of clinical significance be met as well. Id. at 156, 163. If drug
companies, in particular, lack an understanding of what that standard of clinical significance
entails, and particularly if they lack that understanding during the development and clinical trial
process, they are seriously handicapped in the approval process and in the litigation that process
may spawn. A challenger. to approval (other than the government) of course would meet with
the same difficulty, but this Note focuses primarily on the position of the drug companies.
39. 871 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1989).
40. See United States v. 225 Cartons, More or Less, of an Article of Drug, 871 F.2d 409,
411, 420 (3d Cir. 1989) [hereinafter 225 Cartons I] (affirming district court in United States
v. 225 Cartons, More or Less, of an Article of Drug, 687 F. Supp. 946 (D.N.J. 1988) [hereinaf-
ter 225 Cartons 1]). The court required that effectiveness be shown by means of clinical
evidence. Id. at 417. The court reasoned that statements concerning the old formula are
inadequate if the two are not bioequivalents and that adequate, well-controlled studies are
legally necessary to show effectiveness. Id. at 417-19.
41. Id. at 416 (referring to previous decision, Warner-Lambert, 787 F.2d at 155, in which
court "found persuasive the Commissioner's interpretation of the statutory requirement of
effectiveness as requiring a showing that patients will receive a clinically, i.e., therapeutically,
significant benefit from the drug").
42. 158 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
43. See 225 Cartons 11, 871 F.2d at 416 (requiring "real clinical contribution"); see also
Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (indicating that difference
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can be no significance of any kind. "Significance," in Serono Labs, could
simply denote any observable effect, but it appears that there may be more to
the requirement because the argument in the case is, at one level, over the
question of whether there can be a difference without significance.' The
answer to this question is affirmative, so while a difference alone is not
enough, there is no clear indication of what the further element might be.45
Relevant portions of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) define
"effectiveness" as "a reasonable expectation that, in a significant proportion of
the target population, the pharmacological effect of the drug... will provide
clinically significant relief of the type claimed.""". It is possible to argue that
the word "relief' indicates that a difference between two drugs should produce
a difference of effect palpable to the consumer to reach the level of clinical
significance.' This would suggest a highly subjective standard based on
consumers' individual perceptions. On the other hand, a passage from 225
Cartons H suggests that a finding may have clinical significance without even
being necessary for the effect claimed for it, so the individual perception of the
consumer may, therefore, be unnecessary to the determination.'
This leads to the question of causation. On the one hand, clinical signifi-
cance may be a concept applicable to determinations of the existence of a
disease or condition. On the other hand, it may be a concept applicable to
causation determinations - that is, whether the drug was clinically significant
in causing the condition. It is unclear whether the phrase as it is currently
used is intended for both contexts or only one of the two and whether it has
so broad a meaning as to apply in the same way to both analyses.
2. Where Does It Come From and How Can It Be Determined?
In contrast to the confusion surrounding meaning, the FDA approval
cases demonstrate an impressive uniformity as to the types of research and
alone is not enough). In 225 Cartons II, a manufacturer sought an injunction preventing FDA
approval of a new drug, which was granted, and appealed. Id. at 409-10. The court held that
clinical equivalence is required between a pioneer and a generic drug. Id. at 410. The FDA said
that if a variation is not clinically significant for the product's intended uses, it will not preclude
a "sameness" finding for the clinical equivalence requirement. Id. at 411412.
44. See Serono Labs, 158 F.3d at 1316-20 (examining questions of chemical equivalence,
chemical identity, and limitations on inherent variations in discussion that, in effect, asks
whether difference can exist between pioneer and generic drug without significance).
45. See id. (deferring to FDA's view that difference can exist without clinical significance).
46. 21 C.F.R. § 330.10 (2001).
47. Id. (referring to "clinically significant relief").
48. See 225 Cartons IL 871 F.2d 409,419 (3d Cir. 1989) (requiring that each component
of new drug formulation be proven to make "statistically significant clinical contribution to the
effects claimed for the products").
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evidence required to support a finding of "clinical significance." The cases
are not identical in their specific requirements as to issues of formality of
testing or research, size of test groups, re-analysis of previously gathered
materials, or necessity of personal observation.49 However, they are at least
apparently unanimous in disallowing the idea of clinical significance found
at the level of the individual subject - that is, in requiring some organized
gathering of data from a larger group of subjects.50 Each case shows a
somewhat different understanding of what this research entails. In Edison
Pharmaceutical Co. v. FDA,5" the District of Columbia Circuit stated the
following: "There are no well-controlled studies using blind and double-blind
cross-over and randomization techniques or any other kind of control speci-
fied in 21 C.F.R. 130.12(a)(5)(ii), so that neither the clinical nor statistical
significance of the reported results can be evaluated."52 Similarly, in 225
49. On the factor of formality of studies, it will be helpful to describe and compare the
standard types of epidemiological studies performed. "Case Control Studies" begin with a
group that already has the disease (the test/case group). The researcher chooses a second group,
matched except for the disease. The researcher then compares the two groups for past exposure
to the study factor. Bruce R. Parker, Understanding Epidemiology and its Use in Drug and
Medical Device Litigation, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 35, 38 (1998). "Cohort Studies," on the other
hand, examine the population exposed to a study factor and then compare that with an otherwise
similar, but unexposed population. Thus, these studies compare the rate at which the disease
develops in the two populations by comparing the risk ratios. Id. "Randomized Clinical Trials"
compare the "efficacy and safety of two or more interventions or regimens." ROBERT J. LEVINE,
ETHIcs AND REGULATION OF CLNICAL RESEARCH 185 (1986). These studies have four ele-
ments: (1) they are controlled; (2) significance is established statistically, (3) they are double-
blind, when feasible; and (4) they are randomized (therapies are allocated by chance). Id. All
three of these study methods are clearly at the other end of the spectrum of formality from the
paradigm in which the individual physician observes an individual patient's condition and
draws conclusions about the effects of a factor in the treatment.
Also worth noting is the apparent freedom with which the word "significant" is used in
the context of clinical trials. Courts cite expert testimony regarding "significant clinical trials"
without explaining by what standard (if any) the court, or the expert, determined the trial to be
"significant." See Bickham v. Grant, No. 97-CA-01639-COA, 2001 WL 570018, at *18 (Miss.
Ct. App. May 29, 2001) (referring to testimony concerning "significant clinical trial").
50. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing Edison Pharmaceutical Co.
v. FDA, 513 F.2d 1063, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1975), 225 Cartons1, 687 F. Supp. 946 (D.N.J. 1988),
and Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1986)).
51. 513 F.2d 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
52. Edison Pharm. Co. v. FDA, 513 F.2d 1063, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Edison involved
a petition for review of a final FDA order that a new drug was not approvable because of a lack
of substantial evidence showing its safety and effectiveness. Id. at 1065. The court held that
factual questions as to the double-blind test requirement for new drug approval were material
questions of fact requiring a new evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1070-72. The court reiterated the
rule that the burden is on the sponsor to show the effectiveness of the new drug. Id. at 1065.
The court discussed, in this context, the "substantial evidence" requirement and various testing
methods. Id. at 1065-66.
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Cartons I," the District Court of. New Jersey pointed to the importance of
published, well-controlled clinical studies as a basis without which, it as-
serted, it could not make a reliable determination as to any clinically and
statistically significant contribution to the drugs at issue.54
In Warner-Lambert, without an explicit statement of the court's under-
standing of the meaning of "clinical significance," the Third Circuit cited the
FDA "effectiveness" requirements, suggesting that for approval cases, clinical
significance cannot come simply from an individual physician's observation
of effects on one or even a few subjects.5" In discussing the FDA requirement
of substantial evidence, the Warner-Lambert court implied that a finding of
effectiveness, directly associated in the CFR language with the concept of
clinical significance, would have to come from formal clinical trials. 6 Serono
Labs also suggested (again without expressing explicit rules to this effect) that
a finding of clinical significance comes from more formal research and
evidence, such as clinical trials and published literature." Furthermore, there
are also strict requirements regarding the extrapolation of results from clinical
trials, namely that "the results of tests on other products cannot be extrapo-
lated without published dissolution, bioavailability or bioequivalence studies
on the products compared."'6 Thus, the case law is clear on the proper method
of determining clinical significance in this context.
53. 687 F. Supp. 946 (D.N.J. 1988).
54. See 225 Cartons 1, 687 F. Supp. at 961 (pointing to necessity of formal, published,
controlled studies for determination of clinical and statistical significance). In 225 Cartons I,
the United States took action on behalf of the FDA to seize two prescription drug products. Id.
at 948. The court held that the available clinical studies did not establish safety and effectivo-
ness as required, that the clinical investigtons relied upon were not well-controlled or
published, and that data from old studies (of the old formula) cannot be extrapolated in
reference to the new formula. Id. at 960. This case provides an excellent example of the way
in which the word "significance" can be overused to the point at which it loses meaning and
force. See id. at 952-55 (using "significance" so often and in so many contexts, without
explanation, as to make word relatively meaningless).
225 Cartons I later reaffirmed the requirement, stating that significance must be proven
by [formal] studies. 225 Cartons U, 871 F.2d 409, 416 (3d Cir. 1989). In 225 Cartons II,
defendant Sandoz wanted to show "general recognition" and extrapolate from previously
gathered data. Id. However, the court accepted the FDA's position that "published clinical
investigations" were necessary. Id. at 419.
55. Warner-Lambert, 787 F.2d at 156; see also supra note 38 (providing further commen-
tary on this case).
56. See Warner-Lambert, 787 F.2d at 157 (implying necessity of formal clinical trials by
reference to CFR definition of effectiveness).
57. See Serono Labs. Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (following
judgment of expert who relied on clinical trials and published literature to find differences
between two drugs).
58. 225 Cartons lF, 871 F.2dat419.
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Although the FDA approval cases are clear about how to determine
clinical significance, they remain unclear about what clinical significance is.
From the examples of 225 Cartons II, Warner-Lambert, Serono Labs, and
others, it is apparent that in this context, clinical significance is something
more than a simple difference. However, the further element or consideration
required remains obscure. One potential suggestion might be that it involves
the perception of the individual consumer, but this would be so unquantifiable
and so unwieldy a standard as to make it an unlikely candidate for such a
broad scientific standard. Furthermore, there is enough clarity on the issue of
formality of clinical trials in this context to support determinations of "clinical
significance," that the standard likely would not be the individual consumer's
perception. Thus, any further element beyond a simple "difference" remains
undefined.
B. Patent Infringement and False Advertising Cases
The cases dealing with issues of patent infringement and false advertising
demonstrate a certain. reliance on the concept of clinical significance without
any explicit definition of what that means.59 These cases are concerned
primarily with showing differences (or lack thereof) between two drugs. The
question of whether those differences are "significant" forms the crux of the
lawsuit. Furthermore, those differences may or may not be significant specifi-
cally in statistical or in clinical terms. It is this crucial distinction between
statistical and clinical significance that requires further definition.'c
59. A third, less common, but related type of case involves use of alleged false statements
to promote increased use for off-label purposes. See United States v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp.
2d 39, 48-49 (D. Mass. 2001) (citing allegation that "[miedical liaisons were instructed to tell
physicians that a great deal of data existed that supported the safe use of Neurotonin at levels
that exceed 4800 mg per day. However, clinically significant safety data existed at only 1800
mg per day," without defining term "clinically significant.").
60. As in the previous subsection, it will be helpful here to give an in-depth illustrative
example of how this problem manifests itself in this type of case. An example from the false
advertising context demonstrates not only the lack of definition when clinical significance is
required and relied upon, but also the tension between the use of clinical and statistical signifi-
cance. In McNeil-P.P.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 755 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
one manufacturer of an analgesic containing acetaminophen sued another manufacturer that
advertised that its own product, containing acetaminophen and caffeine, provided superior
relief. Id. at 1207-10. (The products involved in this case were AF Excedrin and ES Tylenol.
Id. at 1207-08.) In order to establish that an advertisement claiming test-proven superiority is
false or misleading in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a party must show that the
scientific study underlying the claim was flawed. See id. at 1210-11 (citing Procter & Gamble
Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 747 F.2d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1984) and Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v.
Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 194, 213 (D.D.C. 1989)). (The relevant portion of the
Lanham Act appears at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).) The two manufacturers in this case argued
extensively over the use of statistical and clinical significance. McNeil, 755 F.Supp. at 1212-
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1. What Does "Clinical Significance" Mean?
In the context of patent inftingement and false advertising cases, there is
even less indication of a clear meaning of "clinical significance" than there is
in the approval cases. For example, in a case dealing with the bleaching
effects of a dental care product, there are vague references to a "significant
amount" of the product causing "clinically significant" bleaching, but there is
no attempt to define a standard for clinical significance."' "Clinically signifi-
cant" in this context could mean anything from "noticeable" to "substantial,"
or it could refer to a more defined standard, but these are only guesses. In
Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Laboratories,62 there is a suggestion that
clinical significance might be synonymous with "medical significance," but
because neither term is further defined, this reference adds little to an under-
standing of either phrase.6' In discussing claims about effects made in lay
19. Bristol-Myers argued that there was a statistically significant difference between the two
products in favor of Excedrin, while McNeil denied the existence of any statistical difference.
Id. at 1214. McNeil argued further that even if a statistical difference did exist, Bristol-Myers'
claim was nonetheless false because no clinically significant difference existed. Id. at 1219
n. 12. The court stated categorically, without further explanation, that a lack of clinical signifi-
cance necessarily follows from a lack of statistical significance. Id. The court found that the
statistical analyses were sufficient to meet the burden of proof. Id. at 1219. Statistical signifi-
cance is defined clearly in the case as a ninety-five percent certainty that given results are not
due to chance. Id. The court found that the statistical analyses were sufficient to meet the
burden of proof. Id. at 1219. However, the court did not attempt to define clinical significance
or to explain why it cannot exist in the absence of statistical significance. Id. at 1219 (providing
no definition of clinical significance when one obviously would be helpful). Thus, in this type
of litigation, as at the approval stage, the drug companies are faced with continuing uncertainty
both as to the meaning of, or the standard for, this important term, "clinical significance," and
as to the relationship of clinical significance to statistical significance.
61. See Ultradent Prods., Inc. v. Life-Like Cosmetics, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1101, 1113 (D.
Utah 1996) (providing only the following gloss on "clinically significant bleaching": "This
means that a significant amount of the matrix material must remain in the tray at the end of two
hours and that the bleaching agent dispersed in the matrix material must remain active so as to
provide more than an insubstantial level of bleaching."). The most a reader can take from this
gloss is that clinically significant means "significant" and not "insignificant." Because neither
is defined, the gloss adds no meaning to the reader's understanding of clinical significance.
There is also no indication how, if at all, this finding relates either to the identification of
condition or to a causation analysis.
62. 41 F. Supp. 2d 879 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
63. See Mead Johnson& Co. v. Abbott Labs., 41 F. Supp. 2d 879,883 (S.D. Ind. 1999)
(aligning phrases "clinical significance" and "medical significance" without defining either),
rev'd on other grounds, 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000). In Mead Johnson, a manufacturer of one
infant formula, Isomil, sued a competitor, the maker of Similac, for misleading advertising
under the Lanham Act. Id. at 880-81. Abbott advertised Similac as "1st Choice of Doctors."
Id. The court examined the substance of the claims of the advertisers and considered whether
there was a basis for the claim of superiority. The court looked for evidence of a clinically
significant difference between the products. Id. at 883. Having determined that no scientific
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advertising, another court deciding a Lanham Act case stated that "[a] claim
concerning a drug's effect made in lay advertising to consumers must be
understood as representing that the effect will be experienced in humans and
thus that it has some significance in a clinical context."' This raises again the
possibility that clinical significance (if that is the meaning of "significance in
a clinical context") could be a determination related to an individual con-
sumer's perception of a drug's effects. Similarly, another case looked to
demonstrations of differences in "symptomatic relief' provided by two differ-
ent drugs.6' In that case, however, there were objective methods of measuring
the difference in relief achieved." These cases leave us again with the vague
idea that clinical significance denotes something that can be observed, but
without any idea of the level at which it must be observable, or the level to
which it must rise.
One case involving television commercials for non-prescription heart-
bum medications demonstrates the way in which definition of the term
"clinical significance" may involve a battle of experts over characteriza-
tion.67 The parties directed the court's attention to six clinical studies, of
which two showed statistically significant differences between the two prod-
ucts involved in the commercials, two showed no'statistically significant
differences, and two showed borderline statistical significance." A battle of
experts ensued over the borderline cases, with a disagreement as to whether
evidence showed such a difference, the court allowed the testimony of a physician with "great
expertise" in the area, whose evaluation it credited. Id. The court held that although there were
some differences, there was no clinically significant difference between the two products. Id.
The court granted Mead Johnson's motion for a preliminary injunction against Abbott. Id. at
908. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the phrase meant that more physi-
cians favored the brand in question than favored other brands, not that the majority of physi-
cians favored that brand. Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 201 F.3d 883, 887 (7th Cir.
2000).
64. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 785,799 n.9 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). This case examined the question of whether Anacin, at over-the-counter dosages,
reduces inflammation to a clinically significant extent in conditions listed in advertisements.
Id. passim. The court held that the state of medical knowledge was not such as to allow a
definitive conclusion as to the falsity of the claim. Id. at 801-03.
65. See Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Pharms. Co., CIVA.No. 91-7099,1993 WL 21239, at *3-*4 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (discussing results
of in vivo studies of antacids Mylanta H and ESMP).
66. See id. at *3 (discussing determinations of significant differences in effects of two
antacids by measuring esophageal pH levels).
67. See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck
Consumer Pharms. Co., No. OICIV.2775(DAB), 2001 WL 588846, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 1,
2001) (denying SmithKline's request for preliminary injunction against Merck's commercial
for Pepcid Complete).
68. Id. at *3.
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a 7% difference69 constituted a "modest" difference or a "clinically signifi-
cant" difference between the products.10 The court noted that the clinical
differences, when reduced to absolute numbers, were indeed "modest."'"
There was no dispute concerning the methodology in the studies, nor the
validity of their results, only concerning the characterization of the resulting
figures.72 However, nowhere did the court further elaborate on what it consid-
ered to be the meanings of the terms "modest" and "clinically significant," nor
did the court explain how those terms related to the 7% figure. Having raised
the question of clinical significance, the court moved on to another question
without resolving the characterization dispute."
Perhaps the 'best indication in the existing case law of the current status
or understanding of "clinical significance" appears in the following excerpt
from a case concerning advertising for lotions:
These studies have shown that there is no clinically significant difference
between any of the products in their ability to relieve dry skin. Of course,
whether differences are "significant" depends upon how fine a line is being
drawn. Thus, in the final analysis, this case becomes little more than a
dispute over testing methods, with neither side able to show fraud, decep-
tion, or bad faith on the part of its competitor.74
This provides an excellent practical assessment of the current state of the
phrase. Because no one agrees about what is "clinically significant," each
party simply will develop the meaning that best supports its argument.
2. Where Does It Come From and How Can It Be Determined?
According to the court in Mead Johnson, clinical significance should be
shown by "scientific evidence."" The court did not elaborate on what might
constitute this evidence or how it might be found.76 However, when the court
69. The court accepted the 7% average figure, although Merck's expert challenged the
validity of averaging figures and urged a figure of 11%. Id. at *3.
70. Id. at *3-*4.
71. Id. at *4.
72. Id.
73. The court moved on to the question of "the extent to which re-dosing is the experience
of the average Turns user and the alleged burden upon J&J Merck to disclose in its advertising
that for whatever reason, re-dosing is the experience of only a small number of consumers." Id.
at *4.
74. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1082, 1092
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
75. Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 41 F. Supp. 2d 879, 883 (S.D. Ind. 1999), rev'd
on other grounds, 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000).
76. Id.
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states that in the absence of "scientific evidence," it will instead accept the
opinion testimony of a credible expert in the field, it suggests that the court
was referring to more formal clinical trials or investigations." Thus, it is
apparently possible, although less preferable (perhaps because less reliable),
in this area to determine clinical significance through the expertise and exper-
ience of an individual expert. Thus, in the false advertising cases, no clear
standard emerges, either as to meaning or as to method of determination.
C. Products Liability Cases
The products liability cases deal with evidence and statistical concepts
from epidemiological studies to a greater extent than the other types of cases.
This is almost certainly due to a greater emphasis on causation. In these cases
the question of what "clinical significance" means is intertwined more closely
with that of how it may be determined. A diet drug case, Linnen v. A.H.
Robins Co.,7  demonstrates the ways in which, as well as the reasons for
which, these concepts of significance can be particularly problematic in a
products liability context.79 In a Daubert hearing to determine whether an
expert witness for the plaintiff would be allowed to testify, the defendant drug
company relied upon the typical requirement in these cases of deference to
epidemiological studies (when available) to determine causation by statistical
77. Id.
78. No. CIVA.97-2307, 2000 WL 145758 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 4,2000).
79. See Linnen v. A-H. Robins Co., No. CIV.A.97-2307, 2000 WL 145758, passim
(Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2000) (discussing use of statistical and clinical significance in
determining admissibility of expert testimony). The case in which this hearing occurred was
based on the death of a thirty-year-old woman from Primary Pulmonary Hypertension (PPH),
alleged to have been caused by her short-term ingestion of the diet drug Phen/Fen. Id. at *1.
This is an order on a motion by the defendant drug manufacturer to exclude the testimony of
plaintiff's expert witness. Id. Linnen was exposed to the drug for less than one month. Id. at
*3. The epidemiological study offered by the plaintiff did not cover exposure periods under
three months in length, so no odds ratio was calculated for a relevant length of exposure. Id.
at *1 n.4. Furthermore, the data from the three-month-exposure period is arguably inapplicable
because the cutoff time distinguishing "possible users" from "definite users" (drawn at one full
month of use) lies between the three-month-use period and Linnen's exposure for approximately
three weeks. Id. at *3-*4. The primary argument in this hearing concerned which, if any, of the
available statistics were applicable to Linnen's case. Id. at *2-*4. While relevant epidemiologi-
cal studies showing statistical significance with an odds ratio of at least 2.0 are typically
required, and despite the fact that Linnen's use did not fit the parameters of the study offered,
the court held that the expert's basis for using the statistics for three months was reliable and
denied the motion to exclude. Id. at *5. But cf. Barrow v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, No. 96-689-
CIV-ORL-19B, 1998 WL 812318, at *23 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 1998) ("None of these studies
have resulted in a relative risk factor of 2.0 or more, meaning the results of these studies are not
statistically significant sufficient to denote that silicone gel breast implants are the cause of these
problems.").
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significance standards."° The plaintiff's expert, however, testified that while
the odds ratio in the case, which was less that 2.0, did not meet the requisite
level of statistical significance, it was nevertheless "clinically and diagnosti-
cally significant" and could, therefore, demonstrate causation."' Without
addressing the meaning of "clinical significance" and without providing any
explanation for its decision to depart from the standard probability and
statistics analysis previously accepted in this field, the court simply accepted
80. Linnen, 2000 WL 145758, at *3. One court requiring epidemiological evidence cited
the following statement from an affidavit: "The most important evidence relied upon by
scientists to determine whether an agent (such as breast implants) causc disease is controlled
epidemiologic studies. Epidemiology can be viewed as the study of the causes of diseases in
humans." In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224 (D. Colo. 1998) (citation
omitted). The court then concluded the following:
Therefore, epidemiological studies are necessary to determifte the cause and effect
between breast implants and allegedly associated diseases. A valid epidemiologic
study requires that study subjects, cases, and controls are chosen by an unbiased
sampling method from a definable population. Epidemiology is the best evidence
of causation in the mass torts context.
Id.; see also Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1561, 1573 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (stating
that type of rigorous examination of expert's testimony was so important to toxic tort contexts
in particular, "[t]he court will examine whether the expert's conclusions lack a sufficient basis
in the use of epidemiological and genetic data"). But see Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
696 N.E.2d 909, 917-18 (Mass. 1998) (allowing experts to opine on causation in silicone breast
implant case in absence of epidemiological studies, when experts showed adequate knowledge,
skill, experience, and methodology).
81. Linnen, 2000 WL 145758, at *4.
Some background on the basics of terminology in the epidemiological studies may be
helpful at this point. An "odds ratio" is a measurement that compares the rate or level of
exposure to the study factor in the case population and the control population. Bruce R. Parker,
Understanding Epidemiology and its Use in Drug and Medical Device Litigation, 65 DEF.
COUNs. J. 35, 48 (1998). Odds ratios are distinguishable from "relative risk," which is the
measure of the degree to which it is more likely that an exposed population will develop the
disease than those who are not exposed. Id. at 46-47. For both relative risk and odds ratios,
a finding of I indicates no association, less than I indicates a negative association, and greater
than 1 indicates a positive association. Id. at 47. Neither relative risk nor odds ratios are
measures of causation, although, as one court has pointed out, for proof of "more likely than
not" causation, one would need to prove an association of at least 2.0. See Marder v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Md. 1986) ("In epidemiological terms, a two-fold
increased risk is an important showing for plaintiffs to make because it is the equivalent of the
required legal burden of proof - a showing of causation by the preponderance of the evidence
or, in other words, a probability of greater than 50%."). The "confidence interval" associated
with both of these statistical measurements consists of a percentage (typically, though arbi-
trarily, set in advance of a study at 95%) and a range of values including the high and low ends
of the scale of the relative risk or the odds ratio. Parker, supra, at 50-51; Neil Cohen, Confi-
dence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 385,399-401 (1985). On all these matters, see generally D.H. Kaye, Is ProofofStatistical
Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333 (1986); DAVID KLEINBAUM ET AL., EPIDEMIO-
LOGICAL RESEARCH: PRINCipLES AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS (1982).
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the plaintiffs expert's analysis as "an accurate interpretation of the data.""2
The court seems either to have misunderstood the concept of statistical
significance or to have decided simply to ignore it. The court instead stressed
the reliability of this testimony as determined by the expert's experience,
education, and other professional qualifications. 3 This manner of departure
leaves litigants with little certainty as to what standards will be used and how
they will operate. It also has implications for Daubert standards in general,
as the discrepancies created by cases like Linnen may lead to improper avoid-
ance of the objective standards for introduction of scientific evidence. 4
Furthermore, differences in standards from one jurisdiction to another may
present difficulties for large drug manufacturers who may have to make
inconsistent arguments as a result of the lack of uniformity. The analysis in
the products liability cases binds together the question of meaning and the
question of methods of determination of clinical significance. However, it is
still worthwhile to attempt to answer the two questions separately in order to
better understand how they relate to one another and thus what the phrase
means in this context.
1. What Does "Clinical Significance" Mean?
Because they fall within the field of torts, the products liability cases are
necessarily very concerned with the analysis of causation. Thus, in some of
these cases, the use of the phrase "clinical significance" involves the idea of
causation to some extent, but they still provide little or no definition of the
phrase. A Vaccine Acte5 case, for example, associates "clinical significance"
82. Linnen, 2000WL 145758, at*4.
83. Id. at *4-*5.
84. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (introducing relationship to Daubert
standards). This particular effect would manifest itself primarily in products liability cases. The
judge in Linnen had in fact, only the month before this decision, ruled on a different Daubert
motion to exclude a plaintiff's expert, disallowing testimony of another expert for the plaintiff
because he failed to demonstrate the requisite statistically significant association between the
disease and the exposure. See Linnen v. A. H. Robins Co., No. CIVA.97-2307, 2000 WL
16769, passim (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 1999) (citing testimony of prospective expert that "I
can't point to a single study which would give me a statistically significant result" as well as
citing testimony of another expert that process for determining causation involves finding
statistically significant association between disease and exposure, and allowing motion to
exclude witness for failing to meet Daubert standards for reliable scientific evidence). Judge
Brassard was also very concerned in deciding this motion about the certainty with which the
expert holds the opinion, requiring a "reasonable degree of medical certainty," a standard which
Judge Brassard did not believe Dr. Wellmann met. Id. at *14.
85. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 includes the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation program, which allows, under certain conditions, for compensation for
injuries sustained as a result of vaccines. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-I et seq. (2002). One of the
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and correlation without causation." The physician in that case found that a
vomiting episode was "not clinically significant" and firther stated that any
association between the vaccine and the child's death was coincidental."
Especially in light of the court's requirement of a "reasonable degree of
medical certainty" for this statement, it appears that the court understands
clinical significance to relate directly to causation, so that it cannot exist when
multiple possible causes have not been precluded.88 Another Vaccine Act
case reinforces this understanding by indicating that clinical significance is
something that would point to a cause, or perhaps more accurately, would
eliminate other possible causes. 9 Thus, while a definition is not forthcoming,
there is at least a basic possibility that clinical significance relates to an effect
and implicates causation analysis, perhaps at the level of a "reasonable degree
of medical certainty."
On the other hand, there are also many uses of the phrase "clinical
significance" in the products liability context that provide little or no meaning
at all. Keeping to the context of Vaccine Act cases, for example, one case,
which mentions clinical significance only in passing, defines the phrase
"significant aggravation" as "any change for the worse in a preexisting condi-
tion which results in markedly greater disability, pain, or illness, accompanied
by substantial deterioration of health."' It is arguable that the understanding
of "significant" in one context within a case may be indicative of the under-
standing of "significant" in another within the same opinion. The two con-
cepts, while not equated in the opinion, do seem by virtue of their shared
vocabulary to coincide at some level. This perhaps suggests a meaning for
"significant" in the phrase "clinical significance" beyond denoting simply any
purposes of the program is to provide expedited and simplified procedures in lieu of litigation
against each physician and drug company potentially involved. Russell G. Donaldson, Annota-
tion, Construction and Application of National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (42 US.C.A.
§ 300aa-1 etseq.), 129 A.L.R. FED. 1, 47-48 (1996).
86. See Shepard v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-889V, 1991 WL
220282, at $4-*5 (Cl. Ct. Oct 11, 1991) (discussing causation element in case of death of child
following DPT vaccine).
87. See id. (summarizing physician's testimony that no association existed between
vaccine and death of child).
88. Id. at *4.
89. See Vinyard v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 89-55V, 1990
WL 293374, at *4 (Cl. Ct. June 29, 1990) (citing doctor's testimony that given condition
or symptom had no clinical significance that would point to alternative cause of injuries at
isue).
90. Duflield v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-827V, 1991 WL
275005, at *9 (Cl. Ct. Dec. 2, 1991) (quoting definition from 42 U.S.CA. § 300aa-33(4) (West
1991)). The court mentions "clinical significance" only as being unknown for a particular
physical condition. Id.
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change, and instead pointing toward a requirement of somewhat more substan-
tiality.91
2. Where Does It Come From and How Can It Be Determined?
One might consider that the sources or requirements for determining
clinical significance are more uniform in these cases than in the advertising
context, but such uniformity exists only in their lack of objectivity and stan-
dardization.' That is, the standard is no standard. One case allowed that
clinical significance may be based on clinical studies or experiments conducted
on an individual patient, involving no controls or comparisons with others.9
Similarly, the majority in Glaser deems analysis at an individual level, with no
showing of statistical significance, to be clinically significant.94 In effect, these
cases allow a physician's subjective opinion as an adequate basis for a finding
of clinical significance. The only clear conclusion here is that, apparently,
formal testing or studies, while certainly permissible, are wholly unnecessary
to findings of clinical significance in the products liability context.
The meaning of "clinical significance" in these cases remains unclear.
The method of determining clinical significance allows for great subjectivity.
As long as a court may allow clinical significance by such a standard to be
determinative of a causation question, this level of subjectivity, coupled with
ambiguity of meaning, will frustrate Daubert-type attempts to maintain
objective, consistent, and accurate standards for reliable scientific evidence. 95
D. Evaluation
This discussion demonstrates the degree of confusion in the usage and
meaning of the phrase "clinical significance," both across drug litigation as a
91. See id. passim (discussing possibility of "significant aggravation" of underlying
condition by DPT vaccine throughout opinion, and mentioning unknown "clinical significance"
of a truncated limb).
92. That is, the cases are uniform in not requiring that specific standards be met.
93. See Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 960-61 (1971) (stating that "the
testimony of a specialist in hematology... was sufficient, for the purposes of nonsuit, on the
element of causation, where the specialist's conclusion was based on a series of clinical studies
or experiments he had conducted on plaintiff over a 24-day period ....").
94. See Glaser v. Thompson Med. Co., 32 F.3d 969, 975 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussing prior
opinion, in Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992), in
which Sixth Circuit had considered same type of problem, had examined epidemiological
studies, etc., and had concluded that individual type of determination was inadequate and
invalid, but coming to different conclusion in this case, allowing individual over broader study
results).
95. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing potential ramifications of
continued confusion in this area).
"CLINICAL SIGNIFICANCE" IN DRUG-RELATED LITIGATION 577
whole and in each particular type of case. Even when uniformity may emerge
in a given context, there is often little to explain how to apply that uniformity.
Often, the explicit indications simply run in circular reasoning and meaning.
Thus, no clear indication of a standard emerges from these attempts to find a
meaning from the context in which the phrase appears.
IV Comparison with Uses of Statistical Significance
Another approach to the process of deriving a definition from context is
to examine more closely the relationship between clinical significance and
statistical significance. However, there is considerable disagreement as to the
nature of this relationship, even at the most general level.96 This disagreement
is due primarily to the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of "clinical
significance" because it is clear, or certainly ought to be, to courts, to lawyers,
and to scholars, what statistical significance means.' The following discus-
sion will attempt to pull apart the different understandings of the two concepts
and their relationship to each other. The following arguments represent the
wide range of possible relationships that courts and parties have posited, as
examined by type of case,' by manner of determination," and by the nature
of the relationship between them. 0
A. General Comparison of Uses in Case Law
The FDA approval cases provide an excellent starting point in this
discussion, as the FDA regulations require that a proponent of a new drug
96. See infra Part IV (discussing this disagreement).
97. See Zeneca Inc. v. Eli Lilly& Co., No. 99CV.1452(JOK), 1999 WL 509471, at **25.
26 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1999) (referring to typicalp value requirement of less than .05, but noting
expert's explanation of appropriateness of altering p value to account for alternate endpoints in
given study); McNeil-P.P.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 755 F. Supp. 1206, 1214 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (describing statistical significance as 95% certainty that results are not due to
chance). To find statistical significance requires a substantial number of subjects in the study,
to avoid type 1U errors (false negatives) and still yield positive results. SILVERMAN, supra note
6, at 199. As Silverman has remarked, the level of "significance" in a given study is arbitrarily
determined based on the level of risk of type I error (false positives) that will be accepted. Id.
at 119. As certain and meaningful as a finding of statistical significance may seem, it is
important to remember that the statistical significance of accumulating data, repeatedly tested,
is inevitable. Id. at 123. Thus, there is a level at which statistical significance does not
necessarily have a geat deal of meaning.
98. See infra Part IV.A (examining relationship between statistical and clinical signifi-
cance by type of case).
99. See infra Part IV.B (examining relationship between statistical and clinical signifi-
cance by manner of determination).
100. See infra Part 1V.C (examining range of possible nature of relationship between
statistical and clinical significance).
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produce evidence of both clinical and statistical significance of each compo-
nent of the drug, and that each component of a combination drug make a
"statistically significant clinical contribution" to the effects claimed.' 0' The
cases in this area largely contrast the two types of significance. In addressing
issues related to the safety of a color additive, the court in Simpson v. Young"
deemed "clinically significant" changes to be non-statistical and even possibly
illusory differences and demanded deference instead to statistical evidence.'0 3
The Warner-Lambert court similarly contrasted the two, although without any
positive associations, stating that "[t]herapeutic or clinical significance is
contrasted for this purpose with statistical significance, which ARW accu-
rately characterizes as based on a premise of the elimination of chance re-
sults."'" This may mean that clinical significance is purely concerned with
a doctor's observation, based on his own experience and expertise, of effects
on an individual patient or on a small group of patients, without any formal
testing at all. On the other hand, it may mean that statistical significance
(which comes from the more formal studies) is a necessary base and that
clinical significance must be above and beyond that.
Along the same lines, in the context of false advertising, the McNeil court
stated categorically that no clinical significance can exist in the absence of
statistical significance.10 Thus, the McNeil court appeared to define clinical
significance as a difference that is at least statistically significant, but that
must include something flurther.' °' However, the court gave no real indication
of what that further element might be.
Other courts, even in the same context, leave the relationship between
these two types of significance unexamined and unclear, simply mentioning
the two types in parallel."° For instance, when a court found both types to be
absent, there was no further explanation to define, compare, or contrast the
two types)c The most one could take from that example is that the discussion
101. 225 Cartons 11, 871 F.2d 409,419 (3d Cir. 1989).
102. 854 F.2d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
103. Simpson v. Young, 854 F.2d 1429, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
104. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147, 154 (3d Cir. 1986) (treating
clinical and statistical significance as distinct). It is important to remember that this case
particularly stresses the need for both types of significance to be present Id.
105. McNeiI-P.P.C. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 755 F. Supp. 1206, 1219 n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
106. Id.
107. See Johnson & Johnson-Merck Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm. Co.,
CIV.A.No.91-7099, 1993 WL 21239, at *3-*4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1993) (noting lack of"statisti-
cally or clinically significant difference" between two products).
108. See id. at *4 (using these two phrases in parallel, but failing to clarify definition or
difference because neither was proven).
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involved an assessment, by means of statistical analysis, of differences in
"symptomatic relief' (which one might take to be a "clinical" type of evalua-
tion)."° Thus, it is possible that clinical and statistical significance could
simply be intertwined so that they necessarily are involved with each other
and always come as a pair. At any rate, the reader of these cases is still left
largely with only speculation as to the relation or the relative weight of these
two types of significance in the false advertising cases.
A variation on this treatment occurs in cases that may mention both types
of significance, but do not discuss the relationship between them at all. That
is, the phrases appear in entirely separate parts of the analysis, and for the
most part only in passing. In Diet Drugs, for example, the court mentions
statistical significance in the context of controlled clinical studies."1 The fact
that there is no mention of clinical significance in this scenario indicates
perhaps a lack of concern on the part of the court about the relationship
between the two, or perhaps an idea that only statistical significance is impor-
tant. An isolated reference to clinical significance at another point in the
opinion, however, does indicate an awareness of the phrase and presumably
some understanding of what it means, making yet more intriguing its absence
in the earlier part of the discussion.'
The Linnen case discussed earlier in the products liability context also
serves as an important case in this context. 2 In Linnen, in effect, the court
allowed clinical significance, in the explicit absence of statistical significance,
to determine causation by allowing the testimony of an expert on this point."3
Thus, the Linnen court implicitly agreed with the Glaser court that statistical
significance may hide clinical significance." 4 However, it is still worth noting
that the court in Linnen was contradicting its previous decision to exclude an
expert's testimony when it failed to show statistically significant association
between the drug and the disease."'
109. See id. at *3 (employing statistical analysis on data concerning symptomatic relief).
110. See In re Diet Drugs, Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at 0 15 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 28, 2000) (discussing statistical significance of controlled clinical studies).
111. See id. at *29 (referring to "clinical insignificance" in different portion of opinion).
112. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (discussing Linnen).
113. See Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., CIVA.No. 97-2307,2000 WL 145758, at *4 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2000) (citing and following testimony of expert that "while an odds ratio of
less than 2.0 is not statistically significant, it is clinically and diagnostically significant.... ").
114. See Glaser v. Thompson Med. Co., 32 F.3d 969,975 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing testimony
of expert that statistical significance may obscure clinical significance).
115. Compare Linnen v. A.H. Robins, CIVA.No. 97-2307, 2000 WL 16769, at *3, *14
(Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 1999) (stating, first, rule explained by one expert that to have
scientifically valid basis for assertions in this field, gcnerally accepted scientific methodology
requires examination of controlled human studies to determine whether statistically significant
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The foregoing discussion is likely to have left the reader in a state of
some confusion. This is entirely appropriate as that is exactly where the
relationship between clinical and statistical significance stands. Several
possibilities have emerged to explain the relationship. First, statistical signifi-
cance may be required and may be adequate in the absence of clinical signifi-
cance, which would thus be fairly irrelevant. Second, clinical significance
may be something that statistical significance only obscures and that ought to
be allowed in the absence of statistical significance as meeting reliability
standards under Daubert. Third, the relationship between these two simply
may be unknown and unexamined. None of these standards is a clear favorite
among courts (or even, apparently, within the same court).
B. Comparison of Ways in Which Clinical Significance and Statistical
Significance May Be Determined
A comparison of the ways in which clinical and statistical significance
are found may help one to understand how the two might compare in terms of
reliability and, therefore, in relative weight or admissibility. This understand-
ing may in turn lead to a clear meaning and a proper standard of use for
clinical significance.
The views concerning assessments of statistical significance are over-
whelmingly uniform. Statistical significance can come only from formal trials
or studies, not fiom individual physicians' experience and expertise with
regard to observations of individuals or small groups."' The typical require-
ments for a study are that the study be of sufficient size, that it be controlled
and preferably either blind or double-blind, that it be of sufficient duration,
and, in some cases, that it be published or otherwise subject to some sort of
association exists, and if such association has been demonstrated, evaluation of whether
relationship is causal; then stating that "[a]lthough an expert's opinion ... may be offered on
the basis of probability, reasonableness and likelihood, the scientific principles or knowledge
on which those opinions are based must be held with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.
That level of certainty, while it need not be absolute, must be greater than 'nore likely than
not.") with Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., CIVA.No. 97-2307,2000 WL 145758, at *3-*5 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2000) (allowing expert testimony that failed to show statistical significance
when expert found clinical significance and when court deemed expert otherwise to meet
Daubert standards for "experience, qualifications, education and training").
116. See, e.g., Glaser, 32 F.3d at 975, 986 (Boggs J. dissenting) (making clear that "you
cannot get statistical significance from 'some' individuals"); Simpson v. Young, 854 F.2d 1429,
1436 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that "statistical significance cannot be discerned by the compari-
son that petitioners make among individual animals, but only be a comparison of averages
according to accepted statistical methods.... ."); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147,
154 (3d Cir. 1986) (referring to formal studies to find evidence of statistical significance); In
re Diet Drugs, Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000)
(looking for statistical significance in controlled clinical studies).
"CLINICAL SIGNIFICANCE" IN DRUG-RELATED LITIGATION 581
peer review to show that it was performed in accordance with accepted
practices and standards."' Although statistical significance itself is definable
by each researcher performing a new study, there is a generally accepted
normal level, set at 95% confidence, which maintains a further level of
uniformity." 8 However, when it comes to clinical significance, this unifor-
mity evaporates. One set of cases would have the standards or sources for
finding clinical significance identical to those for statistical significance." 9
Another set of cases contrasts the two standards by allowing that clinical
significance may come from observations of and opinions about individual
subjects, rather than from formal studies.! 20 Somewhere in the middle of these
standards is one yet less defined - that a finding of clinical significance must
be supported by "scientific evidence."'2
As far as re-analysis of, or extrapolation from, previous studies, records,
or literature, there is some indication that these are not permissible manners
in which to find clinical significance. 22 For instance, the court in one prod-
117. See, e.g., Edison Pharm. Co. v. FDA, 513 F.2d 1063, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citing
CFR requirement for controlled studies (as explained, for purposes of that case, in 38 Fed. Reg.
17029 (June 28, 1973) which requires "well-controlled studies using blind and double-blind
cross-over and randomization techniques or any other kind of control specified in 21 C.F.R.
130.12(aX5Xii) .... "), failure to meet which requirement means "neither the clinical nor the
statistical significance of the reported results can be evaluated"); Zeneca Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
No. 99CIV. 1452(JOK), 1999 WL 509471, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. July 19,1999) (noting dependence
of reliability of statistical significance on study size); 225 Cartons I, 687 F. Supp. 946, 961
(D.N.J. 1988) (requiring evidence of "published, well-controlled clinical studies").
118. See supra note 81 (noting standard confidence intervals).
119. See supra notes I 15-117 (discussing these requirements); see also 225 Cartons II, 871
F.2d 409, 416 (3d Cir. 1989) (using "statistical" and "clinical" in parallel in stating require-
ments); 225 Cartons I, 687 F. Supp. at 961 (stating same requirement slightly differently).
120. See, e.g., Glaser v. Thompson Med. Co., 32 F.3d 969, 975 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing
expert opinion that averages involved in finding statistical significance "can really hide
clinically significant differences to things" and referring to those clinically significant differ-
ences as "variations from the mean that could influence one or two patients"); Warner-Lambert
Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1986) (never explicitly defining source of finding
of clinical significance, but contrasting it with formal studies needed to find statistical signifi-
cance, implying that clinical significance is determination made based on observation of
individual); Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. CIVA.97-2307, 2000 WL 145758, at *4 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2000) (allowing expert to base conclusion of clinical significance on plain-
tiff's medical record, expert's own career experience, and clinical observations, rather than
relying on controlled studies).
121. See Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 41 F. Supp. 2d 879, 883 (S.D. Ind. 1999),
("... Abbott makes no claim to medical superiority because it could not support such a claim
with scientific evidence. There is no scientific evidence showing a clinically significant
difference between these products ... ."), rev'don other grounds, 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000).
122. See supra text accompanying note 58 (discussing requirements for extrapolation from
previous studies); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584-85 (1993)
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ucts liability action against the manufacturer of Bendectin held that re-analysis
of epidemiological studies was not permitted to show causation, regardless of
the credibility of the methodology used."
C. Dependence, Exclusivity, or Hierarchy?
One view is that clinical significance cannot exist in the absence of
statistical significance.' 24 This may mean that a finding of clinical signifi-
cance really does not add anything to what we know if something is already
statistically significant because the "clinically significant" differences in this
theory may be simply "illusory.""12 Or it may mean that having reached the
threshold finding of statistical significance, a finding of clinical significance
denotes something beyond that, making the finding somehow more meaning-
ful. "'26 There is no indication, however, that a finding of statistical signifi-
cance depends on a finding of clinical significance. Thus, the relationship
(disallowing results from reanalysis of previous epidemiological studies as unreliable because
not subject to peer review or publication).
123. Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Labs., 646 F. Supp. 856, 865 (D. Mass. 1986). Similarly,
reanalysis using changed p-values for statistical significance is generally not permissible either.
Kelley v. Am. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F. Supp. 873, 879 (W.D. Tex. 1997). The use of p-
values occurs when there is (at least there is assumed to be) no effect in the given population.
It also assumes a fixed level for the test - usually 5%. That means that results are significant
at the 5% level. A p-value is the smallest fixed level at which the null hypothesis can be
rejected. Put another way, a p-value represents the probability of something more extreme than
a given correlation, either positive or negative - that is, the probability that results are due to
chance. A p-value of less than 5% denotes statistical significance, while a p-value of greater
than 5% denotes no statistical significance. For further discussion of p-values and statistical
significance, see American College of Physicians, Effective Clinical Practice: Primer on Statis-
tical Significance and P Values (July/Aug. 2001), available at http://www.acponline.org/
journals/ecp/julaug0l/primer.htm (last visited Mar. 28,2002).
124. In McNeil-P.P.C. Inc., v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 755 F. Supp. 1206, 1219 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), aft'd, 938 F.2d 1544 (2d Cir. 1991), the court stated the following:
McNeil also argues that even if a statistically significant difference exists, the
advertising claim is nonetheless false because no clinically significant difference
exists. Bristol-Myers contends that its advertising does not claim a clinically
significant difference between the two products. In light of the Court's determina-
tion that no statistically significant difference exists, it follows that a clinically
significant difference does not exist.
Id. Similarly, in a case involving fraud in the context of FDA approval of a laser device to treat
angina pectoris, the plaintiffs argued that the results reported by the defendants were "so
incomplete or so statistically flawed as to lack clinical significance." In re PLC Sys., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106, 115 (D. Mass. 1999).
125. See Simpson v. Young, 854 F.2d 1429, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing "differ-
ences supposedly observed" between groups in study, belittling reliance on non-statistical evi-
dence from observation when statistical analysis was available).
126. See infra Part IV.D. (discussing meaningful statistical significance).
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may be one of dependence, but not of mutual dependence. Another view,
however, as we have seen, would allow that clinical significance certainly
may exist in the absence of statistical significance, that in fact relying on
statistical significance as a threshold will only obscure findings of clinical
significance.' 27
Are the two findings then entirely independent of each other? Or is there
perhaps a hierarchy in terms of levels of significance, with clinical requiring
a lower standard than statistical? Neither of these organizational schemes is
entirely satisfactory. Indeed, there is remarkably little order.
D. "Meaningful" Statistical Significance
Some cases draw yet another distinction - that between statistical signifi-
cance and meaningful statistical significance. This distinction returns to the
idea already mentioned, that while a finding of statistical significance does not
necessarily imply a finding of clinical significance, the finding of statistical
significance alone may have more theoretical than practical meaning. n The
FDA requires evidence of a new drug's significance both in statistical and
clinical terms. 29 The FDA's phrase "statistically significant clinical contribu-
tion," describing the effects that manufacturers need to show to obtain ap-
proval for a combination drug, might suggest the view that the two types of
significance together have meaning, but that alone either one might be defi-
cient.130 However, this analysis is, at best, only a guess.
It may seem that some of these arguments read a great deal into very
little language. That may well be so, but these are the best indications that
exist in the current case law. Far more references exist, in these and other
contexts, that give no insight at all into the relationship between these con-
127. See Glaser v. Thompson Med. Co., 32 F.3d 969,975 n.l 1 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussing
testimony of expert who noted that averages can hide clinically significant differences).
128. See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck
Consumer Pharm. Co., 906 F. Supp. 178, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (referring to expert's testimony
that "[y]ou can see statistically significant differences that aren't clinically meaningful"), affd,
100 F.3d 943 (2d Cir. '1996).
129. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147,154-55 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing CFR
requirement, explicitly contrasting these two types of significance without defining either, and
supporting "[tihe Commissioner's interpretation of the statute as requiring a showing of clinical
significance, rather than merely statistical significance" (emphasis added)). Note that this
requirement potentially could eliminate the argument that either type of significance necessarily
entails a finding of the other.
130. See 225 Cartons IL 871 F.2d 409, 416, 419 (3d Cir. 1989) (requiring both types of
significance and associating them closely by expressing FDA requirement in quoted terms above
as well as in terms of "showing that each ingredient is making a real clinical contribution of
statistical significance").
59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 553 (2002)
cepts."' The less certain we are from the language we have, the clearer it is
that there is a problem here. Thus, these interpretations of the language may
not draw the correct conclusions about how the courts understand these terms,
but the endeavor still shows that nothing about this is clear.
E Evaluation
The foregoing analysis of the interaction between statistical and clinical
significance demonstrates the degree to which this area remains unsettled.
The meaning of statistical significance is well established, and its appropriate
application and weight are also fairly clear. However, across jurisdictions and
within individual courts, there is little, if any, uniformity as to the meaning or
the appropriate application of the concept of clinical significance. When the
two concepts appear in the same discussions, no clear pattern emerges to
explain the relationship between them.
V Looking for Definitions In Non-Caselaw Sources
A. Usage in the Code of Federal Regulations
"[W]e have traditionally left to legislators the task of defining terms of a
medical nature that have legal significance." ' 2 The language of the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) is in the background of much of the case law
already discussed. 3 While the most relevant portions, Title 21 (Food and
131. One example of this is the type of passing reference in which both phrases appear in
parallel, without any specific or explicit differentiation, mentioned only as both being absent.
See Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Phann. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm. Co.,
CIVA.No.91-7099, 1993 WL 21239, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1993) ("Not one of the in vivo
studies ... demonstrated any statistically or clinically significant difference in the ability ...
to relieve symptoms . . . ."), affd, 19 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1994). It is simply not clear what the
court's statement tells the reader, or how it furthers the court's analysis. One could make a
tenuous argument from this language either that the court sees them as equivalent concepts, as
if they were in apposition, or that they are different, and that is why the court mentioned both.
Nor is it clear what the court would require of them if the court determined either one or both
were present At best, all that the reader can take from this opinion is that the language is vague
and leaves us with no idea of the meaning or importance of "clinical significance."
132. In re Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1153-55 (ill. App. Ct. 2000) (quoting Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997), in attempt to understand meaning of term "mental dis-
order," which respondent claimed to have "no clinically significant meaning," but which Bailey
court held to be adequately defined by relevant statute).
133. References to the CFR in case law in which the phrase "clinical significance" appears
are rare, but, especially in the drug approval and patent infringement cases, the regulatory
language is implicitly important due to the role that it plays in the earlier stages of the process,
prior to litigation. Where it is mentioned, however, it is generally not for definition or clarifica-
tion of the meaning of the phrase. See supra note 35 (noting that CFR definition of "effective-
ness" incorporates "clinical significance"). While references in the Federal Register would of
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Drugs) and Title 42 (Public Health), both contain many references to findings
of "clinical significance," neither of these sections provides an explicit defini-
tion ofthe phrase. 34 This lack of clarity produces notable difficulties, consid-
ering the fact that a finding of clinical significance is a determinative factor in
several different comxt within the regulations. The fact that the term
appears, however, suggests that there is a proper meaning and, therefore, a
proper use for the term, but it is extremely difficut, if not impossible, to glean
from the context of these usages precisely what that proper meaning might
be.
135
Title 21 sets out in great detail the procedure and requirements for the
investigation, approval, labeling, and advertising of both over-the-counter and
prescription drugs.136 Labeling requirements dictate that there must be an
indication of specific guidance for the physician on preventing "clinically
significant drug/drug and drug/food interactions that may occur."137 They
allow manufacturers to include any data that demonstrates effectiveness in in
vitro or animal tests, but that does not prove by adequate and well-controlled
clinical studies to be pertinent to clinical use, only on the condition that the
following statement precedes the data: "The following in vitro data are avail-
able, but their clinical significance is unknown."3 Without knowing what
constitutes clinical significance, the drug manufaturer and marketer will be
hard pressed to comply with these requirements. The same title of the regula-
tions sets out specific and rigorous requirements for clinical testing of investi-
gational new drugs. 39 In the context of these requirements, the code provides
that in the case of a new protocol, the manufacturer must provide "a copy of the
new protocol and a brief description of the most clinically significant differ-
ences between it and previous protocols.""4 Again, the code also requires
certain safety information on clinically significant drug/drug interactions. 4'
course also be relevant here, none of these references adds enough meaning to contribute to this
discussion. These references are made primarily only in passing.
134. Other CFR Titles, including Title 10 (Energy), Title 14 (Aeronautics & Space), Title
16 (Commercial Practices), Title 29 (Labor), and Title 32 (National Defense), also refer to
"clinical significance" without defining the term in those contexts.
135. The method by which it may be possible to glean such a definition is the same as that
attempted in relation to the case law in the preceding text - by analyzing it contextually.
136. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.57, 202,312.10, 314.50,320.1,330.10, 601.25, 860.7,
868.1900 (2001).
137. Id. § 201.57(f)(4Xi).
138. Id. § 201.57(bX2Xi).
139. Id. §§ 312.20-.38.
140. Id. § 312.30(dX1Xi).
141. See id. § 314.50(dXSXviXa) (describing safety information from clinical investiga-
tions that manufacturers must provide on drug application form).
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The definition of "effectiveness" in the context of over-the-counter drugs
incorporates the concept of clinical significance as follows: "Effectiveness
means a reasonable expectation that, in a significant proportion of the target
population, the pharmacological effect of the drug, when used under adequate
directions for use and warnings against unsafe use, will provide clinically
significant relief of the type claimed."' 42 Perhaps most helpfully here, the
regulation provides that proof of effectiveness "shall consist of controlled
clinical investigations as defined in § 314.126(b)" unless the FDA waives
such requirements.1 43  This is the sort of meager indication that suggests
clinical significance may be something that comes from controlled clinical
investigations. However, it is heavily qualified by the fact that the FDA may
waive the requirement. 44 There is a similar indication (from identical lan-
guage) in the code section dealing with review of licensed biological products
to ensure safety and effectiveness. 4 ' It refers to effectiveness as having a
"clinically significant function in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment,
or prevention of disease in man" and states that "proof of effectiveness shall
consist of controlled clinical investigations" unless waived upon a reasonable
showing of inapplicability or inessentiality." On the other hand, however,
the section does allow for corroboration of investigations by "partially con-
trolled or uncontrolled studies, documented clinical studies by qualified
experts, and reports of significant human experience during marketing."
147
The section expressly disallows "isolated case reports, random experience,
and reports lacking the details which permit scientific evaluation.' ' 4  For
comparison, these same requirements also exist, in largely the same language,
in the context of approval of medical devices.
142. Id. § 330.1O(aX4Xii) (emphasis added).
143. Id. § 330.10(aX4Xii). The referenced definition of controlled clinical investigations
includes characteristics such as a clear statement of objectives and proposed methods of anal-
ysis, a study design permitting valid comparison with a control mechanism, careful selection of
subjects, randomization of treatment to minimize bias, well-defined and reliable assessment of
subject response, and analysis of results adequate to assess the effects of the drug. Id.
§ 314.126(b).
144. See, e.g., id. § 330.10(aX4Xii) (statingthatFDA maywaive requirement "on the basis
of a showing that it is not reasonably applicable to the drug or essential to the validity of the
investigation and that an alternative method of investigation is adequate to substantiate effective-
ness").





149. Id. § 860.7(cXl)-(eX2). There is also a clear example of recognized principles
defining a well-controlled clinical investigation, which is essential to these requirements, at id.
§ 860.7(0.
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Once the drug trial and approval process is complete, the requirements
for advertising become relevant. Here, again, Title 21 addresses numerous
details but does not define clinical significance. One of the criteria by which
the FDA deems advertisements false or misleading is that the advertisement
"contains favorable data or conclusions from nonclinical studies of a drug...
in a way that suggests they have clinical significance when in fact no such
clinical significance has been demonstrated."'" The FDA may deem the
advertisements false or misleading if, among other possibilities, they "use the
concept of 'statistical significance' to support a claim that has not been
demonstrated to have clinical significance or validity, or fails to reveal the
range of variations around the quoted average results.""1 ' The code also
provides that "[c]orrelation of in vivo bioavailability data with an acute
pharmacological effect or clinical evidence of safety and effectiveness may
be required if needed to establish the clinical significance of a special claim,
e.g. in the case of a controlled release preparation."'5 2 These examples seem
to indicate that there are situations in which one must establish clinical
significance as determinative of something, but these examples do not explain
what clinical significance is.
While the discussion so far has related to the approval and marketing
areas, there is little or no relevant language in Title 21 relating specifically to
products liability cases in the pharmaceutical context. However, the sections
discussed above nevertheless may be relevant to products liability litigation
because the clinical studies conducted for the purpose of obtaining FDA
approval could easily later become a source of evidence as well as a source of
dispute in products liability cases.
Title 42 of the CFR addresses issues involving Public Health. In the
section devoted to "Drug Use Review and Electronic Claims Management
System for Outpatient Drug Claims," the code provides definitions that
150. Id. § 202.1(eX6Xvii). One scholar has pointed out the degree to which this continues
to be a problem, in that:
[The] FDA continues to be troubled by the selection and poor quality of research
or, conversely, the misuse of data from apparently adequate and well controlled
studies, the extension or distortion of the claim for usefulness beyond those ap-
proved and the use of pharmacokinetic data or blood tissue levels that suggest
clinical significance but are in fact unsupported by substantial clinical experience.
Milind Kale, Monitoring the Regulatory Process of Prescription Drug Advertising, 5 J. PHARM.
& L. 229, 233 (1996) (quoting Lloyd Millstein, The Regulation ofPrescription Drug Advertis-
ing, 23 AM. PHARMACY 491 (1983)).
151. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(eX7)(ii) (2001). As relates to determinations of biocequivalence or
bioavailability, this code title refers to "medical []significance," but without any indication as
to the relationship between that concept and "clinical significance." Id. § 320.23(b).
152. Id. § 320.28.
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incorporate the concept of "clinical significance," for which there is no
separate definition.153 For example, the regulation defines an "adverse.medi-
cal result" as a "clinically significant undesirable effect, experienced by a
patient, due to a course of drug therapy." ' 4  It defines "overutilization"
alternatively as use "that is greater than necessary to achieve a desired thera-
peutic goal or that puts the recipient at risk of a clinically significant undesir-
able effect." '55 It defines "underutilization" in a similarly alternative fashion,
but for insufficient, rather than excessive, dosage. 56 However, all of these
uses of the phrase in this Title, as with those in Title 21, do not reveal a
concrete definition. Thus, the next potential source for examination is the
information dispensed by the agency that interprets these regulations.
B. Agency Website Information: Test Case on VHD Standards
The following discussion provides one example of data that an agency
provides concerning a particular disease or drug. The FDA's Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research has published and analyzed studies relating to
Valvular Heart Disease (VHD), a condition alleged to be associated with the
use of the diet drugs phentermine, fenfluramine, and dexfenfluramine."' In
doing so, the FDA has promulgated standards for assessing "significant"
VD.158 The word "significant" remains unqualified, but it is at least argu-
able that "clinical" significance is the type that best fits the concept here,
based on the methodology set out in this study.5 9 By reference to In re Diet
153. 42 C.F.R. § 456.702 (2001). (This section falls under the code title of Health Care




157. See U.S. Food & Drug Administration Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA
Analysis of Cardiac Valvular Lysfunction with Use ofAppetite Suppressants, 1997 (providing
information on case reports and survey and study results relating particularly to risk of valvu-
lopathy), available at http /www.fda.gov/cder/news/slides/fenphendat4.pdf (last visited Feb.
12,2002).
158. The FDA provides a "'research' case definition of valvulopathy in the setting of
appetite suppressant use" defining it as "aortic regurgitation of greater than trace/trivial/minimal
severity and/or mitral regurgitation of greater than mild severity, as documented by echocardi-
ography." Id. at 5. Thus the FDA has put forward a definition of the condition and the means
for determining it. However, as this standard is only that of something more than minimal, it
is unclear how much meaning this standard bears.
159. The information in this study consisted of reports from physicians about their small
numbers of patients in their individual practices, from whom they have collected test results and
"clinical data." Id. at 9. These results seem to be very much about individual responses. On
the other hand, the reference to 95% confidence limits that the FDA gives for the study in the
context of a discussion of absolute risk might suggest that the "significance" here is "statistical
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Drugs,"6 in fact, this is precisely the type of significance intended."' Thus,
perhaps one could argue that clinical significance is. defined for this very
precise issue regarding this particular disease.
However, perhaps that leap is premature. For there to be a certain,
genuine connection between "clinical significance" as the statutes and the
cases employ on the one hand, and these standards laid down by the FDA, the
language should match with greater clarity (or indeed identity). Without
identical language, we are left to make assumptions about the meaning of the
words and phrases. Indeed, the apparent fact that only one case actually uses
the phrase "clinical significance" with reference to these standards somewhat
weakens any argument that there is a clear understanding of the relationship
between them. In a subsequent publication, published by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the FDA's Center for Drug Evalua-
tion and Research (CDER) uses the phrase "clinical importance" in discussing
the same subject matter. 62 Not only does this publication fail to define this
significance." Id. at 12. At any rate, the FDA never explicitly identifies the "significant
valvular regurgitation" with which the information here is concerned as "clinically significant."
Nor, if the FDA were to do so, would this identification provide a clear objective standard for
discussing the existence of the condition. These two factors demonstrate the relative uselessness
of the use of "significance" here.
160. Nos. 1203,99-20593,2000 WL 1222042 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000).
161. See In re Diet Drugs, Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *57 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 28, 2000) (using term "clinically significant" in discussion of FDA benchmark for VHD).
Diet Drugs was part of a class action suit against American Home Products Corp. (AHP),
regarding the effects of the appetite suppressants fenfluramine and dexfenfluranime, used to-
gether with the drug phentermine in the regimen known as "Fen-Phen." Id. at *1. In this case,
AHP moved jointly with the class for certification and approval of a nationwide settlement. Id.
The court granted the motion. Id. at *69. The court included among its findings of fact and
conclusions of law a discussion of statistical significance and medical significance in controlled
clinical studies, discussions of clinical significance of certain conditions as found in medical
records, and arguments concerning the "appropriate benchmark for clinically significant VHD."
Id. at *14-*15, *29, *57. Throughout the opinion, the court also often used "significance"
without a qualifier, which makes it difficult to take very much from the discussion as a whole.
See id. passim. The court mentioned, as a factor balancing in favor of approving the settlement,
that it considered the sheer volume of studies on the subject of VHD and the studies' findings
on the use of diet drugs to show that scientific knowledge is sufficiently developed in this area
and thus to support the conclusions the parties had reached. Id. at *63. If the scientific
knowledge is sufficiently developed, but there are still arguments concerning the "appropriate
benchmark," it would seem as though we still have not reached an objective standard. Without
an objective standard, it seems unlikely that "clinical significance" is a term that can add any
meaning to the discussion.
162. See Cardiac ValvulopathyAssociated with Exposure to Fenfluramine orDexfenflura-
mine: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Interim Public Health Recommenda-
tions, November 1997, MORBIDIY AND MORTALIrY WEEKLY REPORT 1061 (1997) (summariz-
ing data used by FDA in decision to request voluntary withdrawal of these drugs and presenting
health recommendations for exposed persons), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/news/
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term, but after it notes that "clinical importance" could be an important factor
to consider, it subsequently states only that the clinical importance of the
given condition in this context is unknown." If clinical significance is to
play any meaningfid role as a standard in these pharmaceutical contexts, the
regulatory bodies involved must define and use the term consistently. These
sparse examples demonstrate that even when there may be clearer standards
promulgated by the regulatory bodies on a very precise issue, the meaning,
both on the general and the specific levels, remains vague and ambiguous.
C. Medical Treatises, Scientific Manuals, and Scholarly Legal Articles
Medical treatises, scientific manuals, and scholarly legal articles are
other potential sources of information regarding the general understanding of
the meaning of clinical significance. In his treatise on human experimenta-
tion, William Silverman discusses significance, statistical and otherwise, and
in doing so, expresses a serious disapproval of the use of the word "signifi-
cance."". He begins a section on terminology by stating that "[if] it were
possible to outlaw the word 'significant' when describing statistical infer-
ences, the ban would go a long way in improving the clarity of our assertions
about the state of evidence in medicine.0 61 He refers to the typical reliance
on the word "significance" as "desperate longing for anchors of certainty in
a sea of doubt," and likens any attempt to define clinical significance to an
attempt to catch a "greased pig."'"
In his treatise, Ethics and Regulation of Clinical Research, Robert Levine
points out the degree to which our culture affirms statistics as determinations
of truth. 67 Further he reminds the reader that scientists, journal editors, and
mmwr.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2002). While the FDA here refers to "clinical'importance"
rather than "clinical significance," there is no reason, from the context, to believe that the two
are qualitatively or conceptually different in meaning and thus for the purposes of this Note they
are interchangeable.
163. Id. at 1064-65.
164. See SILVERMAN, supra note 6, at 127 (discussing confusion over word "significance"
and phrase "statistically significant").
165. See id. (expressing basic idea that "significance" is unhelpful and misleading word
to use because word has no clear meaning at all).
166. Id. at 120, 127. The word is, in Silverman's assessment, completely subjective and,
therefore, leads people to believe that they have found some level of certainty when objectively
they have not. Id. At the very least it must be conceded that any objective standard for clinical
significance necessarily would be limited to a very narrow context. Id. at 121. Silverman actu-
ally refers to a "clinically important difference," rather than "clinical significance" Id. at 120.
However, as discussed supra note 162, rewordings of the concept do not command a conceptu-
ally different meaning.
167. See ROBERTJ. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATIONOF CLNICALRESEARcH 200(1986)
("Our culture seems to affirm statistics as one way of determining what is true, i.e., what is
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the FDA, among other authorities, all require statistical significance for the
establishment of scientific claims.'" This is acceptable because we all share
a common understanding of what statistical significance is, and can thus rely
on this understanding. However, for clinical significance to be meaningful
and reliable to the extent that our culture might affirm it as it affirms statistical
significance, a clearer definition or standard will have to emerge. Otherwise,
clinical significance never will achieve the determinative force with which
some attempt to credit it.
The scholarly legal articles that deal with medical, and particularly drug
or pharmaceutical product topics, tend to use the phrase "clinical significance"
only in passing, without any discussion of what it means. 9 It seems, in fact,
that more often than not the author is noting a lack of clinical significance.
This might explain, if not excuse, the absence of a definition, as perhaps there
is less need to define Something that is not there. Even so, as long as there are
statements in this literature to the effect that, as one scholar has described it,
clinical significance is "the relevant measuring stick for all studies," it is
important to try to understand what clinical significance is." 0 Thus, however
minimal the amount of material, it is worth an attempt to extract what defini-
tion one can from these academic, as opposed to legislative and judicial, uses
of the phrase. In terms of positive contributions to the definition, there are a
few isolated indications.
In their article on Lanham Act litigation, Charles Walsh and Marc Klein
spare only a few lines for discussion of statistical and clinical significance."'
These authors provide an appositive statement, containing what appears to be
sufficiently true (or sufficiently proven) so that it may be revealed as an accepted fact, one that
is worthy of disclosure."). The relevant portion of this book discusses Randomized Clinical
Trials (RCTs). Id. at 185-212. Levine identifies major problems associated with their design
and implementation. Id. Levine calls the RCT the "gold standard for evaluating therapeutic
efficacy." Id. at 211.
168. Id. at 200.
169. See Beverly W. Lubit, Note, The Time Has Come for Doing Science: A Call for the
Rigorous Application of Daubert Standards for the Admissibility of Expert Evidence in the
Impending Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, 42 N.Y.L. Scll L. REV. 147, 169-70 (1998)
(demonstrating generic example of this type of usage, as follows: "Because the spectrum of
effects is so wide, autoimmune processes are commonly invoked to explain many diseases of
unknown etiology, and highly sensitive assays often reveal auto-antibodies even though they
are of no clinical significance").
170. See Andrea C. Levine, NAD Case Reports Voluntary Self-Regulation of National
Advertising, 808 PRAc. L. INST. COM. L. 73, 143 (2000) (placing quoted phrase in apposition
to phrase "clinical significance").
171. See Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, From Dog Food to Prescription Drug
Advertising: LitigatingFalse Scientific Establishment Claims Under theLanhamAct, 22 SETON
HALL L. REV. 389, 436 (1991) (devoting only twelve lines of text, in fifty-seven page article,
to these two phrases).
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a proposed meaning for the phrase "clinical significance." '  They gloss
clinical significance as meaning "that the perceived difference is relevant to
the use of a medication for treatment."' 73 It is not clear that this definition
really tells the reader anything, but Walsh and Klein probe no further (if they
have probed at all). At most, the reader learns from this that clinical signifi-
cance entails some effect that has more than a theoretical impact on the pa-
tient's outcome.
In one instance, simple word association implicates a possible identity of
meaning between "clinical" and "therapeutic."'7 4 Other references provide
some information through examples. For instance, one reference states the
following:
The effectiveness of a drug is traditionally demonstrated by proving (in
well-controlled, double blind clinical studies) that the drug affects some
clinically significant endpoint. An example of a clinically significant
endpoint is death- if the experimental drug reduces the number of patients
who die from a particular disease, then it is deemed effective in treating
that disease.'
7'
The same discussion also refers to "the efficacy of a drug [being] proven by
showing an effect on a non-clinically significant endpoint that indicated a
likely clinical effect.' 76 A similar analysis suggests that clinical significance
should be defined in terms of potential harm to the patient. 7 Examined
together, these references only reinforce the impression of ambiguity and
vagueness that pervades the use of this phrase, with the possibility of a stress
on the idea of something that will have a perceptible impact on the patient's
condition or treatment.
172. Note that they put clinical significance in quotation marks, but not statistical signifi-
cance. Id.
173. Id. Walsh and Klein also distinguish between "clinically significant" and "clinically
trivial," reinforcing the idea that a perceptible clinical difference may not necessarily be clin-
ically significant. Id. at 436 n.228.
174. See Mary C. McCarron, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs: Safeguarding the
Mentally Incompetent Patient's Right to Procedural Due Process, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 477,481
n.28 (1990) (referencing "clinically significant therapeutic effects").
175. Nancy K. PlantAdequate Well-Controlled Clinical Trials: Reopening the BlackBox,
I-SPO WIDENERL. SYMP. J. 267,272 (1996).
176. Id.
177. See Laizure, supra note 13, at 537 n.130 (citing ARTHUR F. SHINN, EVALUATIONS OF
DRUG INTERACTIONS, xii (Arthur F. Shinn & Mark J. Hogan, eds., 1988), in which Shinn rated
drug interactions at different levels of clinical significance). Shinn describes drug interactions
of "moderate" clinical significance, for example, as being "of moderate potential harm to the
patient, [as] less predictable or [that) occur less frequently, or lack complete documentation,"
whereas those of "minimal" clinical significance are "of little potential harm to the patient, have
variable predictability or occur infrequently, or have little documentation." Id.
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When the foundation for clinical significance, or the way in which it is
properly determined, is concerned, there is some indication that formality of
testing and studies is at least preferred, if not necessary.'18 However, a
contrast appears concerning the issue of the substantiality of the difference to
be regarded as clinically significant. On the one hand, it is not the case that
any deviation or difference is necessarily clinically significant. 79 On the
other hand, a difference can have little or no clinical significance and still
have costs to individuals and society.8 °
Thus, the references to clinical significance in the secondary materials
add little to clarify an understanding of the proper use and meaning of that
phrase in the drug litigation context. There is little indication of concern
about the problem (or even recognition of the problem) on the part of individ-
ual authors. Therefore, it is only in looking at the broader array of possibili-
178. See Ivan L. Preston, Description and Analysis of FFC Order Provisions Resulting
From References in Advertising to Tests or Surveys, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 229, 276 n.207 (1987)
(requiring that for test results to be clinically significant, test must be of sufficient duration); see
also Levine, supra note 170, at 143 (requiring "sufficient test population" to achieve clinical
significance).
179. One author has written about statistical significance in the FTC's regulation of
advertising, first quoting from the opinion in Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. 648, 724 (1984),
then adding his own analysis.
"A danger in evaluating clinical trials is to misinterpret a failure to demonstrate a
difference between two treatments as meaning that the treatments are in fact the
same. When differences are statistically significant, the results can be said to be
due to essential differences in the drugs. When differences are statistically insignif-
icant," however, this does not rule out the possibility that real differences exist.
Even when differences are statistically significant, they can be clinically insignifi-
cant. Bristol-Myers stated that a determination must be made concerning whether
a statistically significant difference is clinically significant; this will not be so if
scientists regard the difference as too small to matter.
Preston, supra note 178, at 283 (quoting Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 724). Another
scholar warns:
Statistical significance should not be confused with medical significance. A result
that is statistically significant means only that chance has probably been excluded
as an explanation. Whether the result has implications for health care is a medical
or public health judgment, not a statistical one. A test of statistical significance is
not determinative of medical or clinical significance, nor does it validate a result.
Charles Q. Socha, All Journal Articles are Not Created Equal: Guidelines for Evaluating
Medical Literature, 67 DEF. CoUNS. J. 61, 68-69 (2000). Note that these discussions tell us
something about the relationship between the types of significance, but they still do not provide
a definition of clinical significance.
180. See Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50
HASTINGS L. J. 241,305 (1999) (citing ROBERT A. ARONOwTrZ, MAKIo SENSE OF ItL ESS:
SCIENCE, SocIETY, AND D=AE 107 (1998), who includes as among these costs iatrogenic harm,
worry, stigma, and abuse of sick role).
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ties that it becomes apparent how disparate, or at least how vague, the views
on the problem can be.
D. Evaluation
In sum, the secondary sources beyond the case law add very little to any
understanding of clinical significance. The regulatory language incorporates
the phrase and gives it determinative importance, but never defines it. The
agency's provision of more specific standards for a particular disease refers,
although in inconsistent language, to the concept without explicit explanation.
Academic usage, even when it ostensibly provides a definition or a descrip-
tion, fails to put forward a definitive statement. Academics more often use the
phrase in passing, without paying particular attention to its meaning. Thus,
once more, only confusion and ambiguity emerge from the use of the phrase
in these sources.
VI Final Evaluation and Conclusion
Having presented a survey of the various indications from case law,
legislative materials, and academic sources, it is apparent how little clarity,
and certainly how little consensus, there is concerning the meaning and
appropriate usage of the phrase "clinical significance." It is possible without
too much artificiality to organize the contextual indications into a few poten-
tially coherent definitions. The two most basic of these understandings seem
to be so different as to be irreconcilable. They are at opposite ends of the
spectrum of possible meanings - whether there may be something else in
between the two is something not yet worked out.
The first of these would require that a finding of clinical significance be
based on formal studies of sufficient size, duration, controls, randomization,
and so on, to make a scientifically sound generalizable determination. How-
ever, it is unclear what one would use the resulting finding to look for or to
decide. Such a finding would likely produce only statistical significance. It
is not clear that a finding from a study would aid the clinician who must apply
it.' In fact, it appears that these requirements are so much like those for
181. One author has stated a clinician's perspective on diagnosis and treatment that
implicates this issue: "Diagnosing disease is an act with consequences, not merely a cognitive
exercise that matches the particular patient to specific disease criteria." ARoNowrrz, supra note
180, at 246 n.20. For the detennination of clinical significance to be of practical use to those
who will apply it to patients or who might look for it in studies of patients, there must be an
observable effect on those patients. See also Cordis Corp. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys.,
Inc., No. CIVA97-550-SLR, 1998 WL 422300, at 03 n.4 (D. Del. July 17, 1998) (stating, in
medical device case, that particular result from study, "while not statistically significant, has
some clinical significance because doctors make decisions based upon such data").
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finding statistical significance as to be simply redundant. The findings would
be reliable and consistent, but would add little value that determining statisti-
cal significance did not gain already.
A second possible understanding of clinical significance involves observ-
ing the individual patient (or perhaps a few patients), drawing associations
between two events (namely, use of a drug and an observable change in the
patient's condition), and arguing for a causal link between the two. The major
problem here is with the evidence of causation. Unless all other potential
causes have been precluded, which is nearly impossible in a small sample or
test group, this argument would be based purely on the experience and exper-
tise of the individual clinician. When this judgment goes explicitly against the
statistically significant results available from larger or more formal studies,
its reliability becomes questionable. In short, "clinical significance" by this
definition is simply not reliable. It represents only a guess based upon experi-
ence, with too small a sample and too many possibilities for other causes.
A third possibility, from an entirely different angle, might set very specif-
ic standards for clinical significance for each given drug or disease (like the
FDA's standards for VHD, or the Black Lung test standards). However, in
that scenario, the usefulness of a uniform phrase would be questionable.
There is no need for generalization if the phrase cannot be generally applied.
A fourth standard might be to define clinical significance as a statistically
significant finding with an observable therapeutic effect. However, as com-
pelling as this might sound, it still lacks any clear indication of the level to
which such an effect must rise, and thus still is not a very meaningful or useful
standard on which to rely.
At its worst, "clinical significance" is assigned no explicit meaning at all,
but simply appears in passing. Of all of the pitfalls listed so far, this is per-
haps the worst. Therefore, it makes sense either that the phrase should be
endowed with some specific meaning or that it should not be used at all. This
leads to the question of the purpose a definition might serve, if an adequate
definition could be constructed. Admittedly, all that is statistically significant
is not necessarily important in a clinical setting, either because there is no
therapeutic effect on the individual patient, or because it is too undetectable
a difference to be applied by the clinician."n
If "clinical significance" can be clearly defined in a way that differenti-
ates it from statistical significance, I believe that the contrast would be a
useful one. For the phrase to be useful, however, the definition must be both
general enough to apply to a range of particular circumstances, and yet precise
enough to be helpful in the particular context at issue, so it must retain a
182. See supra note 181 (remarking on diagnostic approach of clinician).
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certain amount of flexibility. At the same time, it must be concrete enough to
afford consistency of understanding and application. However, all of the
options laid out in this final evaluative section demonstrate the shortcomings
and potential pitflls of the possible approaches.
If a definition cannot be formulated in a workable fashion - and the
current mess suggests that it cannot - it would be much better to do away with
the phrase at the general level and use it only when specifically defined for a
narrow context. For that matter, it is unnecessary at the specific level to use
the phrase at all. Instead, one might avoid the ambiguities and vagueness of
both "clinical" and "significant" by defining threshold findings and determina-
tions of causation in terms specific to the given disease, condition, or drug
involved.
As the phrase stands now, it makes little if any positive contribution to
drug-related litigation, while at the same tine causing several important
problems that will only grow worse with continued confusion and ambiguity.
Discrepancies, like those among the Linnen orders, leave litigants unsure of
what the phrase means and how courts will apply it."83 This uncertainty may
make room to accommodate avoidances of Daubert's gatekeeping standards.
Either there must be a uniform, objective understanding ofthe phrase "clinical
significance" in drug-related litigation, or the phrase should not be used at all,
but something must change to maintain an acceptable level of predictability
and fairness in these cases.
183. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining these discrepancies).
